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Abstract
Automatic service discovery is essential to realizing the full potential of the Internet of Things
(IoT). While discovery protocols like Multicast DNS, Apple AirDrop, and Bluetooth Low Energy
have gained widespread adoption across both IoT and mobile devices, most of these protocols
do not offer any form of privacy control for the service, and often leak sensitive information such
as service type, device hostname, device owner’s identity, and more in the clear.
To address the need for better privacy in both the IoT and the mobile landscape, we de-
velop two protocols for private service discovery and private mutual authentication. Our pro-
tocols provide private and authentic service advertisements, zero round-trip (0-RTT) mutual
authentication, and are provably secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk key-exchange model. In con-
trast to alternatives, our protocols are lightweight and require minimal modification to existing
key-exchange protocols. We integrate our protocols into an existing open-source distributed ap-
plications framework, and provide benchmarks on multiple hardware platforms: Intel Edisons,
Raspberry Pis, smartphones, laptops, and desktops. Finally, we discuss some privacy limitations
of the Apple AirDrop protocol (a peer-to-peer file sharing mechanism) and show how to improve
the privacy of Apple AirDrop using our private mutual authentication protocol.
1 Introduction
Consider a smart home with dozens of IoT devices: an alarm system, a nanny camera, health
monitoring devices, house controls (e.g., lighting, heating), and electronics. Many of these devices
need to be controlled by multiple people, including residents, guests, employees, and repairmen.
The devices must be easily discoverable by all these people.
To provide a good experience, IoT devices advertise the services they offer using a service
discovery mechanism. Examples include Mutlticast DNS (mDNS) [CK13a, CK13b], Apple Bon-
jour [Bon13], Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [BLE14], and Universal Plug-N-Play (UPnP) [UPn15].
These mechanisms require only a broadcast communication channel between the devices (unlike
older discovery protocols [Jin13, CZH+99, ZMN05] that need a directory service). Moreover, these
protocols adhere to the zero configuration networking charter (Zeroconf ) [Zer04] and can operate
with minimal user intervention.
Privacy is an important feature often missing in zero-configuration service discovery protocols
(e.g., Zeroconf) [KW14a, KW14b, KBSW13, PGM+07]. Services broadcast extensive information
about themselves in the clear to make it easy for clients to discover them. Advertisements often
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include sensitive information such as service type, device hostname, and the device owner’s identity.
This poses a threat when the service is running on a private device (e.g., an alarm system or a
smart watch). Identities obtained from personal devices can be used for user profiling, tracking, and
launching social engineering attacks. A recent study [KBSW13] revealed that 59% of all devices
advertise their owner’s name in the clear, which is considered harmful by more than 90% of the
device owners. Indeed, one would not want random visitors, or passerbys, to “discover” the alarm
system in their home. Only authorized clients, such as the home owner and her family, a technician,
or local police, should be able to discover this device.
In this work, we address this problem by building a new discovery and authentication mechanism
that respects the privacy of both sides.
Private service discovery. Our goal is to ensure that services are only discoverable by an
authorized set of clients. This problem is challenging as on one hand, services want to advertise
themselves only after confirming that the client trying to discover them is authorized to see them.
On the other hand, clients want to reveal their identity only after verifying that the service they are
talking to is the desired one. In particular, a client device, such as a smartphone, should not simply
identify itself to every device in the wild that requests it. This leads to a chicken-and-egg problem
reminiscent of the settings addressed by secret handshakes and hidden credentials [BDS+03, LDB05,
JKT06, AKB07, HBSO03, FAL04].
Private mutual authentication. A closely related privacy problem arises during authentication
between mutually suspicious entities. Most existing mutual authentication protocols (SIGMA [CK02,
Kra03], JFK [ABB+04], and TLS [DR08]) require one of the parties (typically the server) to reveal
its identity to its peer before the other, effectively making that party’s identity public to anyone
who communicates with it. This is undesirable when the participants are personal end-user de-
vices, where neither device is inclined to reveal its identity before learning that of its peer. Private
mutual authentication is the problem of designing a mutual authentication protocol wherein each
end learns the identity of its peer only if it satisfies the peer’s authorization policy.1
An application. Our private discovery protocols apply broadly to many identification and key-
exchange settings. Here we describe a common mobile-to-mobile example: peer-to-peer file sharing.
Protocols such as AirDrop and Shoutr have become popular among mobile users for sharing photos
and other content with their friends. These peer-to-peer protocols typically work by having a
participant start a sharing service and making it publicly discoverable. The other device then
discovers the service and connects to it to complete the file transfer. While this offers a seamless
sharing experience, it compromises privacy for the device that makes itself discoverable—nearby
devices on the same network can also listen to the advertisement and obtain identifiers from it. A
private service discovery mechanism would make the service advertisement available only to the
intended devices and no one else. The AirDrop protocol offers a “contacts-only” mode for additional
privacy, but as we show in Section 2.1, this mechanism leaks significant private information. The
private discovery protocols we develop in this paper provide an efficient solution to these problems.
1While protocols like SIGMA-I [Kra03, CK02] and TLS 1.3 [KW15, Res15] can ensure privacy against passive adver-
saries, they do not provide privacy against active attackers.
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1.1 Our Contributions
This paper presents private mutual authentication and service discovery protocols for IoT and
mobile settings. Given the network connectivity constraints implicit to these settings, our protocols
do not require devices to maintain constant connectivity to an external proxy or directory service
in the cloud. Furthermore, the protocols do not require the participants to have an out-of-band
shared secret, thereby allowing devices with no pre-existing relationships to discover each other (in
accordance with their respective privacy policies).
In Section 2, we motivate the desired features we seek in our protocols by presenting a case
study of the Apple AirDrop protocol—specifically, its “contacts-only” mode for private file sharing.
We describe several privacy vulnerabilities in the design of AirDrop, which we have disclosed to
Apple. In light of these vulnerabilities, we define the robust privacy guarantees that we seek in our
protocols.
Protocol construction. Our protocols are designed for distributed public-key infrastructures,
such as the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [RL96]. Each principal has a public
and private key-pair (for a signature scheme), and a hierarchical human-readable name bound to
its public key by a certificate chain. The key primitive in our design is an encryption scheme that
allows messages to be encrypted under an authorization policy so that it can be decrypted only by
principals satisfying the policy. Using this primitive, we design a mutual authentication protocol
where one party sends its identity (certificate chain) encrypted under its authorization policy. This
protects the privacy of that party. The other party maintains its privacy by revealing its identity
only after verifying the first party’s identity. The same primitive is also used to construct a private
service discovery protocol by having a service encrypt its advertisement under its authorization
policy before broadcasting.
The service advertisements in our discovery protocol carry a signed semi-static Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key. The signature provides authenticity for the advertisements and protects clients from
connecting to an impostor service. The semi-static DH key enables clients to establish a se-
cure session with the service using zero round-trips (0-RTT), similar to what is provided in TLS
1.3 [Res15, KW15].
The authorization policies considered in this work are based on name prefixes. For instance, a
technician Bob from HomeSecurity Corp. may have the name HomeSecurityCorp/Technician/Bob,
and a home security system might have a policy that only principals whose name starts with
HomeSecurityCorp/Technician are allowed to discover it. Encrypting messages under a prefix-
based authorization policy is possible using a prefix encryption scheme [LW14], which can be
constructed using off-the-shelf identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes [BF01, BB04].
Protocol analysis. We give a full specification of our private mutual authentication and service
discovery protocols in Sections 4 and 5. We also discuss a range of practical issues related to our
protocol such as replay protection, ensuring perfect forward secrecy, and amortizing the overhead
of the prefix encryption. In Appendices D and E, we provide a rigorous proof of the security and
privacy of both protocols in the Canetti-Krawczyk key-exchange model [CK01, CK02, Kra03].
Implementation and evaluation. We implemented and deployed our protocols in the Vana-
dium open-source distributed application framework [Van]. We measured the end-to-end latency
overhead for our private mutual authentication protocol on an Intel Edison, a Raspberry Pi, a
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smartphone, a laptop, and a desktop. On the desktop, the protocol completes in 9.5 ms, which
corresponds to a 1.8x slowdown over the SIGMA-I protocol that does not provide mutual privacy.
On the Nexus 5X and the Raspberry Pi, the protocol completes in just over 300 ms (about a 3.8x
slowdown over SIGMA-I), which makes it suitable for user-interactive services such as AirDrop and
home security system controls that do not have high throughput requirements.
For the discovery protocol, a service’s private discovery message consists of approximately 820
bytes of data. Since mDNS broadcasts support up to 1300 bytes of data, it is straightforward to
deploy our discovery protocol over mDNS. In Section 6, we also discuss mechanisms for deploying
the protocol over Bluetooth Low Energy and other protocols where the size of the advertisement
packets are much more constrained.
Based on our benchmarks, our protocols are practical on a range of IoT devices, such as ther-
mostats (e.g., Nest), security systems (e.g., Dropcam), and smart switches (e.g., Belkin Wemo).
All of these devices have hardware comparable to a Pi or an Intel Edison. In fact, the Intel Edison
is marketed primarily as a platform for building IoT applications. Moreover, as our AirDrop anal-
ysis demonstrates, many of the privacy issues we describe are not limited to only the IoT setting.
Indeed, in Section 6.4, we show how our private mutual authentication and discovery protocols can
be efficiently deployed to solve privacy problems in peer-to-peer interactions on smartphones. On
more constrained processors such as the ARM Cortex M0, however, we expect the handshakes to
take several seconds to complete. This makes our protocols less suitable in Cortex M0 applications
that require fast session setup. Nonetheless, our protocols are sufficient for a wide range of existing
IoT and mobile scenarios.
2 Desired Protocol Features
In this section, we define the privacy properties and features that we seek in our protocols. We
begin with a case study of Apple’s AirDrop protocol, and use it to motivate our privacy concerns
and desired features.
2.1 Case Study: Apple AirDrop
AirDrop is a protocol for transferring files between two devices running OS X (Yosemite or later)
or iOS (version 7 or later). It is designed to work whenever two AirDrop-enabled devices are
close to each other and even when they do not have Internet access. AirDrop uses both Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) and Apple’s peer-to-peer WiFi technology (awdl) for device discovery and file
transfer.
To receive files, devices make themselves discoverable by senders. AirDrop offers two modes for
making devices discoverable: everyone, which makes the device discoverable by all nearby devices,
and contacts-only (default), which makes the receiving device discoverable only by senders in its
contacts. The contacts-only mode is meant to be a privacy mechanism and can be viewed as a
solution to the private service discovery problem for the “contacts-only” policy.
Protocol overview. We analyzed the AirDrop protocol to understand its privacy properties and
see how it solves the chicken-and-egg problem of private mutual authentication. Below, we present
a high-level description of the AirDrop protocol in contacts-only mode, based on the iOS9 security
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guide [Inc15] and our experiments with observing AirDrop flows between a MacBook Pro and an
iPhone.
1. When a sender opens the sharing pane on her device, the device advertises a truncated
hash of the sender’s identity over BLE, and simultaneously queries for a service with label
AirDrop. tcp.local over mDNS.
2. A nearby receiving device matches the hash of the sender’s identity against its contacts list.
If a match is found, the receiving device starts a service and advertises its instance name,
awdl IP address, and port number over mDNS, under the label AirDrop. tcp.local.
3. The sending device obtains the receiving device’s service advertisement, and initiates a TLS
(version 1.2) connection to it over awdl. The TLS handshake uses client authentication,
wherein each device sends its iCloud identity certificate2 to the other in the clear. The
handshake fails if either party receives a certificate for someone not in their contacts list.
4. Once the TLS connection is established, the receiver’s description is displayed on the sending
device’s sharing pane. The sender selects the receiver as well as the files to be shared which
are then sent over the established TLS channel.
Privacy weaknesses in Apple AirDrop. Our analysis indicates that AirDrop employs two
main privacy checks in contacts-only mode. First, a receiving device responds only if the sender’s
identifier (received over BLE) matches one of its contacts, and second, a communication channel
is established between a sender and receiver only if their respective certificates match a contact
on their peer’s device. While necessary, these checks are insufficient to protect the privacy of the
sender and receiver. Below, we enumerate some of the privacy problems with the existing protocol.
• Sender and receiver privacy and tracking. The use of TLS 1.2 with client authentication
causes both the sender and receiver to exchange certificates in the clear. This makes their
identities, as specified by their certificates, visible to even a passive eavesdropper on the net-
work. Moreover, the public keys in the certificates allow the eavesdropper to track the sender
and receiver in the future. While using a key-exchange protocol like SIGMA-I [Kra03] or TLS
1.3 [Res15] would hide the certificate for one of the parties (the sender in this case), the certifi-
cate of the other party (the receiver) would still be revealed to an active attacker. Protecting
the privacy of both parties against active attackers, requires private mutual authentication,
as constructed in Section 4.
• Sender impersonation. Another privacy problem is that the sender’s identifier advertised
over BLE can be forged or replayed by an attacker to trick an honest receiver into matching
it against its contacts. Based on the receiver’s response, the attacker learns whether the
receiver has the sender in their contacts, and moreover, could try to initiate a TLS session
with the receiver to obtain its certificate. To protect against this kind of impersonation
attack, discovery broadcasts must provide some kind of authenticity, as in Section 5.
2All AirDrop-enabled devices have an RSA public and private key pair and an iCloud certificate for the owner’s
identity.
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2.2 Protocol Design Goals
The privacy properties of AirDrop are insufficient to solve the private service discovery problem.
While our case study in Section 2.1 focuses exclusively on the AirDrop protocol, most existing key-
exchange and service discovery protocols do not provide robust privacy and authenticity guarantees.
We survey some of these alternative protocols in Section 8. In this section, we describe the strong
privacy properties we seek in our protocols. We want these properties to hold even against an active
network attacker (i.e., an attacker that can intercept, modify, replay and drop packets arbitrarily).
We begin by describing two concrete privacy objectives:
• Mutual privacy. The protocols must ensure that the identities and any identifying attributes
of the protocol participants are only revealed to authorized recipients. For service discovery,
this applies to both the service being advertised and the clients trying to discover it.
• Authentic advertisements. Service advertisements should be unforgeable and authentic.
Otherwise, an attacker may forge a service advertisement to determine if a client is interested
in the service.
Finally, to ensure that our protocols are applicable in both IoT and peer-to-peer settings, we impose
additional constraints on the protocol design:
• No out-of-band pairing for participants. The protocol should not require participants
to exchange certain information or secrets out-of-band. This is especially important for the
discovery protocol as the service may not know all the clients that might try to discover it
in the future. Besides impacting feasibility, the pairing requirement also degrades the user
experience. For instance, the main charm of AirDrop is that it “just works” without needing
any a priori setup between the sender and recipient.
• No cloud dependency during protocol execution. The protocol should not rely on an
external service in the cloud, such as a proxy or a directory service. Protocols that depend on
cloud-based services assume that the participating devices maintain reliable Internet access.
This assumption fails for many IoT devices, including devices that only communicate over
Bluetooth, or ones present in spaces where Internet access is unreliable. Again, a nice feature
of the AirDrop protocol is that it works even if neither device is connected to the Internet.
Thus, we seek a protocol that maximizes peer-to-peer communication and avoids dependence
on global services.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe our identity and authorization model, as well as introduce the crypto-
graphic primitives we use in our constructions.
Identity and authorization model. We define our protocols for a generic distributed public-
key infrastructure, such as SDSI [RL96]. We assume each principal has a public and private key-pair
for a signature scheme and one or more hierarchically-structured human-readable names bound to
its public key via a certificate chain. For instance, a television set owned by Alice might have
a certificate chain binding the name Alice/Devices/TV to it. The same television set may also
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have a certificate chain with the name PopularCorp/Products/TV123 from its manufacturer. Our
protocols are agnostic to the specific format of certificates and how they are distributed.
Principals authenticate each other by exchanging certificate chains and providing a signature on
a fresh (session-specific) nonce. During the authentication protocol, a principal validates its peer’s
certificate chain, and extracts the name bound to the certificate chain. Authorization decisions
are based on this extracted name, and not the public key. For example, Alice may authorize all
principals with names matching the prefix pattern Alice/Devices/* to access her television set.
In this work, we consider prefix-based authorization policies.
Prefix-based policies can also be used for group-based access control. For instance, Alice may
issue certificate chains with names Alice/Family/Bob, and Alice/Family/Carol to her family
members Bob and Carol. She can then authorize her family to discover and access her home
security system simply by setting the authorization policy to Alice/Family/*.
3.1 Cryptographic and Protocol Building Blocks
We write Zp to denote the group of integers modulo p. For a distribution D, we write x ← D to
denote that x is drawn from D. For a finite set S, we write x
r
←− S to denote that x is drawn
uniformly at random from S. A function f(λ) is negligible in a security parameter λ if f = o(1/λc)
for all c ∈ N.
Identity-based encryption and prefix encryption. Identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84,
BF01, Coc01, BB04] is a generalization of public-key encryption where public keys can be arbitrary
strings, or identities. We give more details in Appendix A. Prefix encryption [LW14] is a general-
ization of IBE where the secret key skid for an identity id can decrypt all ciphertexts encrypted
to any identity id′ that is a prefix of id (in IBE, decryption succeeds only if id = id′).3 Prefix
encryption allows for messages to be encrypted under a prefix-based policy such that the resulting
ciphertext can only be decrypted by principals satisfying the policy.
It is straightforward to construct prefix encryption from IBE. The following construction is
adapted from the Lewko-Waters scheme [LW14]. The key for an identity id = s1/s2/ · · · /sn consists
of n different IBE keys for the following sequence of identities: (s1), (s1/s2), . . . , (s1/s2/ · · · /sn).
Encryption to an identity id′ is just IBE encryption to the identity id′. Given a secret key skid for
id, if id′ is a prefix of id, then skid contains an IBE identity key for id
′.
The syntax of a prefix encryption scheme is very similar to that of an IBE scheme. Secret
keys are still associated with identities, but ciphertexts are now associated with prefix-constrained
policies. In the following, we write PE.Enc(mpk, π,m) to denote an encryption algorithm that takes
as input the public key mpk, a message m, a prefix-constrained policy π, and outputs a ciphertext
ct. When there is no ambiguity, we will treat mpk as an implicit parameter to PE.Enc. We write
PE.Dec(skid,ct) for the decryption algorithm that takes in a ciphertext ct and a secret key skid
(for an identity id) and outputs a message if id matches the ciphertext policy π, and a special
symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Other cryptographic primitives. We write {m}k to denote an authenticated encryption [BN00,
Rog02, BRW03] of a message m under a key k, and KDF(·) to denote a key-derivation func-
3Lewko and Waters [LW14] considered the reverse setting where decryption succeeds if id is a prefix of id′, but their
construction is easily adaptable to our setting.
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tion [DGH+04, Kra10]. We describe these additional primitives as well as the cryptographic as-
sumptions (Hash Diffie-Hellman and Strong Diffie-Hellman [ABR01]) we use in our security analysis
in Appendix A.
Key-exchange model. We analyze the security of our private mutual authentication and privacy
service discovery protocols in the Canetti-Krawczyk [CK01, CK02, Kra03] key-exchange model,
which models the capabilities of an active network adversary. We defer the formal specification of
this model and our generalization of it to the service discovery setting to Appendix B.
4 Private Mutual Authentication Protocol
In this section, we describe our private mutual authentication protocol and discuss some of its
features and limitations. We use the identity and authorization model described in Section 3.
Protocol execution environment. In our setting, each principal has a signing/verification key-
pair and a set of names (e.g., Alice/Devices/TV) bound to its public verification key via certificate
chains. For each name, a principal possesses an identity secret key (for the prefix encryption scheme)
extracted for that name. The secret key extraction is carried out by IBE root authorities (who pos-
sess the IBE master secret key msk), which may coincide with certificate authorities. For example,
Alice could be an IBE root that issued both an identity secret key and a certificate chain to its
television set for the name Alice/Device/TV. Similarly, the television set may also have an iden-
tity secret key from its manufacturer Popular Corp. for the name PopularCorp/Products/TV123.
Finally, each principal also has one or more prefix-constrained authorization policies.
In our protocol description, we refer to the initiator of the protocol as the client and the
responder as the server. For a party P , we write idP to denote a certificate chain binding P ’s
public key to one of its identities. For a message m, we write sigP (m) to denote P ’s signature on
m. We refer to each instantiation of the key-exchange protocol as a “session,” and each session is
identified by a unique session id, denoted sid.
Protocol specification. Our starting point is the 3-round SIGMA-I protocol [Kra03, CK02]
which provides mutual authentication as well as privacy against passive adversaries. Similar to the
SIGMA-I protocol, our protocol operates over a cyclic group G of prime order where the Hash-
DH [ABR01] assumption holds. Let g be a generator of G. We now describe our private mutual
authentication protocol. The message flow is illustrated in Figure 1.
1. To initiate a session with id sid, the client C chooses x
r
←− Zp, and sends (sid, g
x) to the server.
2. Upon receiving a start message (sid, gx) from a client, the server S chooses y
r
←− Zp, and does
the following:
(a) Encrypt its name idS using the prefix encryption scheme under its policy πS to obtain
an encrypted identity ctS ← PE.Enc(πS , idS).
(b) Derive authenticated encryption keys (htk, atk) = KDF(gx, gy , gxy) for the handshake
and application-layer messages, respectively.
(c) Compute a signature σ = sigS(sid,ctS, g
x, gy) on its encrypted identity and the ephemeral
session state, and encrypt (ctS , σ) using htk to obtain a ciphertext c.
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C(idC , πC)
sid, gx
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S(idS , πS)
sid, gy, {
ctS︷ ︸︸ ︷
PE.Enc(πS , idS), sigS(sid,ctS , g
x, gy)}htk
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sid, {idC , sigC(sid, idC , g
x, gy)}htk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 1: Message flow between the client C (with certificate idC and policy πC) and the server S
(with certificate idS and policy πS) for the private mutual authentication protocol. Both the client
and the server possess a secret signing key. The associated verification keys are bound to their
identities via the certificates idC and idS , respectively. For a message m, sigC(m) and sigS(m)
denote the client’s and server’s signature on m, respectively. Both the client and server know the
master public key for the prefix-based encryption scheme, and the client possesses a secret key skC
for the prefix-based encryption scheme for the identity associated with its certificate idC .
The server replies to the client with (sid, gy, c).
3. When the client receives a response (sid, gy, c), it derives the keys (htk, atk) = KDF(gx, gy, gxy).
It tries to decrypt c with htk and aborts if decryption fails. It parses the decrypted value
as (ctS , σS) and checks whether its identity idC satisfies the server’s policy πS (revealed by
ctS). If the client satisfies the server’s policy, it decrypts ctS using its identity key skC
to obtain the server’s identity idS . If idS satisfies the client’s policy πC and σS is a valid
signature on (sid,ctS , g
x, gy) under the public key identified by idS , the client replies to the
server with the session id sid and an encryption c′ of (idC , sigC(sid, idC , g
x, gy)) under htk.
Otherwise, the client aborts.
4. Upon receiving the client’s response (sid, c′), the server tries to decrypt c′ using htk and aborts
if decryption fails. It parses the decrypted value as (idC , σC) and verifies that idC satisfies its
policy and that σC is a valid signature on (sid, idC , g
x, gy) under the public key identified by
idC . If so, the handshake completes with atk as the shared session key and where the client
believes it is talking to idS and the server believes it is talking to idC . Otherwise, the server
aborts.
4.1 Protocol Analysis
In this section, we highlight some properties of our private mutual authentication protocol.
Comparison with SIGMA-I. Our authentication protocol is very similar to the SIGMA-I key-
exchange protocol [Kra03, §5.2], but with the following key difference: the server’s certificate,
idS , is sent encrypted under a prefix encryption scheme. Moreover, instead of deriving separate
MAC and encryption keys from the shared DH key, we combine the two primitives by using an
authenticated encryption scheme. Since we have only added an additional layer of prefix encryption
to the certificates, each party’s signature verification key is still bound to its identity as before.
Thus, the proof that the SIGMA-I protocol is a secure key-exchange protocol [CK02, §5.3] (with
perfect forward secrecy) translates to our setting.
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Identity privacy. The identity of the server is sent encrypted under its prefix policy, so by secu-
rity of the prefix encryption scheme, it is only revealed to clients that satisfy the policy. Conversely,
an honest client only reveals its identity after it has verified that the server’s identity satisfies its
policy. We formally define our notion of mutual privacy in Appendix C. Then, in Appendix D,
we show that the protocol in Figure 1 achieves our notion of mutual privacy. In contrast, the
SIGMA-I protocol does not provide such a guarantee as the identity of the server is revealed to
active adversaries.
Policy privacy. The protocol in Figure 1 ensures privacy for the client’s policy, but not for the
server’s policy. This issue stems from the fact that the underlying prefix encryption scheme is
not “policy-hiding,” meaning an encryption of a message m to a prefix π is only guaranteed to
hide m and not π. Since a passive adversary can observe whether a connection is successfully
established between a client and a server, learning the server’s policy allows the adversary to then
infer information about the client’s identity. We describe a solution based on anonymous IBE in
Section 7.
Caching the encrypted certificate chains. By introducing prefix encryption, the protocol
in Figure 1 is more computationally expensive for both the server and the client compared to the
SIGMA-I protocol. However, for key-exchange security, it is not essential that the server re-encrypt
its certificate chain using the prefix encryption scheme on each handshake. The server can instead
reuse the same ctS across multiple handshakes. Thus, the cost of the IBE encryptions needed to
construct ctS can be amortized across multiple handshakes. The client still needs to perform a
single IBE decryption per handshake.
Unlinkability. One limitation of our private mutual authentication protocol is that an active
network attacker can fingerprint a server. Certainly, if the server reuses the same encrypted certifi-
cate across multiple handshakes, an active attacker that does not satisfy the server’s authorization
policy can still use the encrypted certificate to identify the server across sessions. Even without
the caching optimization, an active attacker can still track the server via its signature. This is
because in many signature schemes such as ECDSA, the public verification key can effectively be
recovered from a message-signature pair [Bro09]. Thus, as long as the server’s signing key (and
correspondingly, verification key) is long-lived, the server’s public verification key can be used to
identify and track the server across sessions. In fact, when deploying mutual authentication proto-
cols, it is good practice to include the verification key in the signature in order to defend against
Duplicate Signature Key Selection (DSKS) attacks [MS04, KM13].
Depending on the use case, this linkability issue can be problematic. A simple fix is to instead
apply the prefix encryption to the entirety of the server’s response message in the SIGMA-I pro-
tocol. Then, both the server’s certificate chain as well as its signature on the ephemeral shares
are encrypted under the prefix encryption scheme. As a result, the server’s response is unique per
session and can only be decrypted by clients whose identities satisfy the server’s policy. Security
of the resulting key-exchange protocol still reduces naturally to the SIGMA-I protocol and privacy
still reduces to the security of the prefix encryption scheme. The main disadvantage of this protocol
is that the server can no longer cache and reuse the prefix-encrypted ciphertext. Thus, the server
must perform a prefix encryption during each handshake, increasing the computational load on the
server. We give the message flow for this modified protocol in Figure 2. Using ProVerif [BSC16],
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C(idC , πC)
sid, gx
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S(idS , πS)
sid, gy, PE.Enc (πS , {idS , sigS(sid, idS , g
x, gy)}htk)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sid, {idC , sigC(sid, idC , g
x, gy)}htk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 2: Message flow between the client C and the server S for the variant of the private mutual
authentication protocol that provides unlinkability. The main difference between this protocol and
the private mutual authentication protocol in Figure 1 is that here, the server encrypts its entire
response using prefix-based encryption. In contrast, in the protocol in Figure 1, the server only
encrypts its certificate chain using the prefix-based encryption scheme.
we are able to formally verify (in a Dolev-Yao model of protocol logic [DY81]) that this modified
protocol satisfies the following notion of unlinkability: no client can distinguish between two servers
that have different signing and verification keys but use the same policy. For the other properties
(key-exchange security and mutual privacy), our analysis (in the standard computational model)
in Appendix D applies.
Security theorem. We state the security theorem for our private mutual authentication protocol
here, but defer the formal proof to Appendix D.
Theorem 4.1 (Private Mutual Authentication). The protocol in Figure 1 is a secure and pri-
vate key-exchange protocol in the Canetti-Krawczyk key-exchange model assuming the Hash Diffie-
Hellman assumption in G and the security of all underlying cryptographic primitives.
5 Private Service Discovery Protocol
In this section, we describe our private service discovery protocol. The primary goal is to make
a service discoverable only by parties that satisfy its authorization policy. Additionally, once a
client has discovered a service, it should be able to authenticate to the server using zero round-trips
(0-RTT), i.e., include application data on the first flow of the handshake. 0-RTT protocols are
invaluable for IoT since devices are often constrained in both computation and bandwidth.
The key idea in our design is to have the service include a fresh DH share and a signature in
its advertisement. The DH share allows 0-RTT client authentication, and the signature provides
authenticity for the service advertisement. Next, the service encrypts its advertisement under its
policy πS before broadcasting to ensure that only authorized clients are able to discover it. A
similar mechanism for (non-private) 0-RTT authentication is present in OPTLS and the TLS 1.3
specification [Res15, KW15], although OPTLS only provides server authentication.
Protocol specification. Our protocol works over a cyclic group G of prime order p with gen-
erator g where the Strong-DH and Hash-DH assumptions [ABR01] hold. The private discovery
protocol can be separated into a broadcast protocol and a 0-RTT mutual authentication protocol.
Each broadcast is associated with a unique broadcast identifier bid and each session with a unique
session identifier sid. The protocol execution environment is the same as that described in Section 4.
The basic message flow for the private discovery protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Service broadcast message. To setup a new broadcast with broadcast id bid, the server S
chooses a fresh DH exponent s
r
←− Zp, and encrypts (idS , g
s, sigS(bid, idS , g
s)) using the prefix
encryption scheme under its authorization policy πS to obtain a broadcast ciphertext ctS . The
server broadcasts (bid,ctS).
0-RTT mutual authentication. Upon receiving a broadcast (bid,ctS), a client performs the
following steps to establish a session sid with the server:
1. The client C checks that its identity idC satisfies the server’s authorization policy πS (included
with ctS). If so, it decrypts ctS using its prefix encryption secret key and parses the
decrypted value as (idS , g
s, σS). It verifies that idS satisfies its policy πC and that σS is a
valid signature on (bid, idS , g
s) under the public key identified by idS . If any step fails, the
client aborts.
2. To initiate a session with id sid, the client first chooses an ephemeral DH exponent x
r
←− Zp. It
derives authenticated encryption keys (htk, htk′, eadk) = KDF(gs, gx, gsx), where htk and htk′
are used to encrypt handshake messages, and eadk is used to encrypt any early application
data the client wants to include with its connection request. The client encrypts the tuple
(idS , idC , sigC(bid, sid, idS , idC , g
s, gx)) under htk to obtain a ciphertext c1 and any early
application data under eadk to obtain a ciphertext c2. It sends (bid, sid, g
x, c1, c2) to the
server.
3. When the server receives a message from a client of the form (bid, sid, gx, c1, c2), it first derives
the encryption keys (htk, htk′, eadk) = KDF(gs, gx, gsx), where s is the DH exponent it chose
for broadcast bid. Then, it tries to decrypt c1 with htk and c2 with eadk. If either decryption
fails, the server aborts the protocol. Otherwise, let (id1, id2, σ) be the message obtained from
decrypting c1. The server verifies that id1 = idS and that id2 satisfies its authorization policy
πS . Next, it checks that σ is a valid signature on (bid, sid, id1, id2, g
s, gx) under the public key
identified by id2. If all these checks pass, the server chooses a new ephemeral DH exponent
y
r
←− Zp and derives the session key atk = KDF(g
s, gx, gsx, gy , gxy).4 The server encrypts the
tuple (bid, sid, id1, id2, g
s, gx, gy) under htk′ to obtain a ciphertext c′1, and any application
messages under atk to obtain a ciphertext c′2. It replies to the client with (bid, sid, g
y, c′1, c
′
2).
4. When the client receives a response message (bid, sid, gy , c′1, c
′
2), it first decrypts c
′
1 using htk
′
and verifies that c′1 decrypts to (bid, sid, idS , idC , g
s, gx, gy), where s ∈ Zp is the server’s semi-
static DH share associated with broadcast bid, and x ∈ Zp is the ephemeral DH share it used
in session sid with broadcast bid. If so, it derives atk = KDF(gs, gx, gsx, gy, gxy) and uses atk
to decrypt c′2. The handshake then concludes with atk as the shared session key.
5.1 Protocol Analysis
We now describe some of the properties of our private service discovery protocol in Figure 3.
4In this step, the server samples a fresh ephemeral DH share gy that is used to derive the application-traffic key atk.
This is essential for ensuring perfect forward secrecy for all subsequent application-layer messages (encrypted under
atk). We discuss the perfect forward secrecy properties of this protocol in Section 5.1.
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Server’s Broadcast:
bid,PE.Enc(πS , (idS , g
s, sigS(bid, idS , g
s)))
0-RTT Mutual Authentication:
C(idC , πC)
bid, sid, gx, {idS , idC , sigC(bid, sid, idS , idC , g
s, gx)}htk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S(idS, πS)
bid, sid, gy, {(bid, sid, idS , idC , g
s, gx, gy)}htk′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3: Basic message flow between the client C (with certificate idC and policy πC) and the
server S (with certificate idS and policy πS) for the private discovery protocol. As in the private
mutual authentication protocol (Figure 1), the client and server each possess a secret signing key,
and the associated verification keys are bound to their identities via the certificates idC and idS ,
respectively. Both the client and server know the master public key for the prefix-based encryption
scheme, and the client possesses a secret key skC for the prefix-based encryption scheme for the
identity associated with its certificate idC . In this protocol, the client can also include early
application data in the first flow of the 0-RTT mutual authentication protocol under a key derived
from the client’s ephemeral DH share gx and the server’s semi-static DH share gs.
0-RTT security. The security analysis of the 0-RTT mutual authentication protocol in Figure 3
is similar to that of the OPTLS protocol in TLS 1.3 [KW15] and relies on the Strong-DH and Hash-
DH assumptions [ABR01] in the random oracle model [BR93b]. Note that in contrast to the OPTLS
protocol which only provides server authentication, our protocol provides mutual authentication.
Replay attacks. One limitation of the 0-RTT mode is that the early-application data is vulner-
able to replay attacks. A typical replay-prevention technique (used by QUIC [FG14, LJBN15]) is
to have the server maintain a list of client nonces in the 0-RTT messages and reject duplicates for
the lifetime of the service advertisement. While this mechanism is potentially suitable if the service
advertisements are short-lived and the service does not have to maintain large amounts of state,
the general problem remains open.
Authenticity of broadcasts. Because the service broadcasts are signed, a client is assured of
the authenticity of a broadcast before establishing a session with a service. This ensures that the
client will not inadvertently send its credentials to an impostor service. However, an adversary
that intercepts a service broadcast and recovers the associated semi-static DH exponent can replay
the broadcast for an honest client. If the client then initiates a session using the DH share from
the replayed advertisement, the adversary compromises the client’s privacy. To protect against
this kind of replay attack, the server should include an expiration time in its broadcasts, and more
importantly, sign this expiration. Then, by having short-lived broadcasts, the adversary’s window
of opportunity in mounting a replay attack is greatly reduced. Note though that recovering the
semi-static DH exponent s from gs amounts to solving the discrete log problem in the underlying
group, which is conjectured to be a difficult problem. Thus, it is unlikely that authenticity will
be compromised even for long-lived broadcasts. However, perfect forward secrecy (discussed next)
is compromised for all early-application data for the duration of the broadcast, and so, it is still
preferable to have short-lived broadcasts.
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Forward secrecy. Since the server’s semi-static DH share persists across sessions, perfect forward
secrecy (PFS) is lost for early-application data and handshake messages sent during the lifetime
of each advertisement. Specifically, an adversary that compromises a server’s semi-static DH share
for a particular broadcast is able to break the security on all early-application data and handshake
messages (which contain the client’s identity) in any key-exchange session that occurred during the
lifetime of the particular broadcast. To mitigate this risk in practical deployments, it is important
to periodically refresh the DH-share in the server’s broadcast (e.g., once every hour). The refresh
interval corresponds to the window where forward secrecy may be compromised.
While PFS is not achievable for early-application and handshake messages for the lifetime of
a service’s broadcast, PFS is ensured for all application-layer messages (as long as the server’s
semi-static secret was not already compromised at the time of session negotiation). In particular,
after processing a session initiation request, the server responds with a fresh ephemeral DH share
that is used to derive the session key for all subsequent messages. In Appendix E, we show that
the security of the session is preserved even if the server’s semi-static secret is compromised (after
the completion of the handshake) but the ephemeral secret is uncompromised. This method of
combining a semi-static key with an ephemeral key is also used in the OPTLS [KW15] protocol.
Identity privacy. As was the case in our private mutual authentication protocol from Section 4,
privacy for the server’s identity is ensured by the prefix-based encryption scheme. Privacy for the
client’s identity is ensured since all handshake messages are encrypted under handshake traffic keys
htk and htk′. We formally state and prove mutual privacy for the protocol in Appendix E.3.
Security theorem. We conclude by stating the security theorem for our private service discovery
protocol. We give the formal proof in Appendix E.
Theorem 5.1 (Private Service Discovery). The protocol in Figure 3 is a secure and private service
discovery protocol in a Canetti-Krawczyk-based model of key-exchange in the random oracle model,
assuming the Hash Diffie-Hellman and Strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions in G, and the security
of the underlying cryptographic primitives.
6 Protocol Evaluation and Deployment
In this section, we describe the implementation and deployment of our private mutual authen-
tication and service discovery protocols in the Vanadium framework [Van]. We benchmark our
protocols on a wide range of architectures: an Intel Edison (0.5GHz Intel Atom), a Raspberry Pi 2
(0.9GHz ARM Cortex-A7), a Nexus 5X smartphone (1.8GHz 64-bit ARM-v8A), a Macbook Pro
(3.1GHz Intel Core i7), and a desktop (3.2GHz Intel Xeon).
Vanadium. We implement our private mutual authentication and service discovery protocols as
part of the Vanadium framework for developing secure, distributed applications that can run on
a multitude of devices ranging from small computers such as Raspberry Pis and Intel Edisons, to
computers running Linux or Mac OS, to cloud services like Google Compute Engine. At the core
of the framework is a remote procedure call (RPC) system that enables applications to expose
services over the network. All RPCs are mutually authenticated, encrypted and bidirectional.
The framework also offers an interface definition language (IDL) for defining services, a federated
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naming system for addressing them, and a discovery API for advertising and scanning for services
over a variety of protocols, including BLE and mDNS.
The Vanadium identity model is based on a distributed PKI. All principals in Vanadium pos-
sess an ECDSA P-256 signing and verification key-pair. Principals have a set of human-readable
names bound to them via certificate chains, called blessings. Blessings can be extended locally
and delegated from one principal to another. All RPCs are encrypted and mutually authenticated
based on the blessings bound to each end. The access control model is based on blessing names,
and is specified in [ABP+15].
We implement our protocols to enhance the privacy of the Vanadium RPC and discovery frame-
work. Our entire implementation is in Go5 (with wrappers for interfacing with third-party C
libraries). Go is also the primary implementation language of Vanadium.
6.1 Identity-Based Encryption
The key primitive we require for our protocols is prefix-based encryption, which we can construct
from any IBE scheme (Section 3.1). For our experiments, we implemented the Boneh-Boyen (BB2)
scheme [BB04, §5] over the 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig (bn256) [NNS10] pairings curve. We chose the
BB2 IBE scheme for its efficiency: it only requires a single pairing evaluation during decryption.
Other IBE schemes either require pairing operations in both encryption and decryption [BF01] or
require multiple pairing evaluations during decryption (BB1) [BB04, §4.1]. We apply the Fujisaki-
Okamoto transformation6 [FO99] to obtain CCA-security. For the underlying symmetric encryption
scheme in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, we use the authenticated encryption scheme from
NaCl [Ber09, BLS12]. All of our cryptographic primitives are chosen to provide at least 128 bits of
security.
Benchmarks. We measured the performance overhead of the different IBE operations, as well
as the pairing operation over the elliptic curve. Our results are summarized in Table 1. We use
the off-the-shelf dclxvi implementation [NNS10] for the bn256 pairing curve on all architectures
other than the Nexus 5X. On the Nexus 5X, we use a Go implementation.7 On the desktop, we
were able to turn on assembly optimizations which led to a significant speedup in the benchmarks.
Deployment. The Vanadium ecosystem includes identity providers, which are principals that
sign the root certificate of a blessing (certificate chain). While any principal can become an iden-
tity provider, Vanadium runs a prototype identity provider for granting blessings to users based
on their Google account. These blessings begin with the name dev.v.io. We augment this ser-
vice so that it also acts as an IBE root and issues prefix encryption secret keys. More specifi-
cally, we run an RPC service for exchanging any Vanadium blessing prefixed with dev.v.io (e.g.,
dev.v.io/u/Alice/Devices/TV) with a prefix encryption secret key for the blessing name.
5https://golang.org
6The Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [FO99] provides a generic method of combining a semantically-secure public-
key encryption scheme with a symmetric encryption scheme to obtain a CCA-secure hybrid encryption scheme in
the random oracle model.
7We were not able to use the dclxvi implementation on the Android phone. A significant speedup should be possible
with an optimized implementation.
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Intel Edison Raspberry Pi 2 Nexus 5X⋆ Laptop Desktop
Pairing 254.5 ms 101.2 ms 219.2 ms 5.0 ms 1.0 ms
Encrypt 406.7 ms 157.2 ms 161.3 ms 8.2 ms 3.5 ms
Decrypt 623.0 ms 235.2 ms 235.7 ms 11.6 ms 3.7 ms
Extract 107.5 ms 41.6 ms 47.2 ms 2.1 ms 0.5 ms
⋆ Unoptimized Go implementation of bn256.
Table 1: IBE micro-benchmarks
6.2 Private Mutual Authentication
We implemented the private mutual authentication protocol from Section 4 within the Vanadium
RPC system as a means to offer a “private mode” for Vanadium services. We implemented the
protocol from Figure 1 that allows caching of the encrypted server certificate chain. The imple-
mentation uses a prefix encryption primitive implemented on top of our IBE library.
Benchmarking. We measure the end-to-end connection setup time for our protocol on various
platforms. To eliminate network latency, we instantiate a server and client in the same process.
Since the encrypted server certificate chain can be reused across multiple handshakes, we precom-
pute it before executing the protocol.8 Both the client and the server use a prefix-based policy of
length three. Note that the encryption and decryption times in our prefix encryption scheme are
not affected by the length of the policy.
Results. We compare the performance of our protocol to the traditional SIGMA-I protocol in
Table 2. The end-to-end latency on the desktop is only 9.5 ms, thanks to an assembly-optimized
IBE implementation. The latency on smaller devices is typically around a third of a second,
which is quite suitable for user-interactive applications like AirDrop. Even on the Intel Edisons (a
processor marketed specifically for IoT), the handshake completes in just over 1.5 s, which is still
reasonable for many applications. Moreover, with an optimized implementations of the IBE library
(e.g., taking advantage of assembly optimizations like on the desktop), these latencies should be
significantly reduced.
The memory and storage requirements of our protocol are very modest and well-suited for the
computational constraints of IoT and mobile devices. Specifically, the pairing library is just 40 KB
of code on the ARM processors (and 64 KB on x86). The public parameters for the IBE scheme
are 512 bytes, and each IBE secret key is just 160 bytes. For comparison, a typical certificate chain
(of length 3) is about 500 bytes in Vanadium. Also, our protocols are not memory-bound, and in
particular, do not require much additional memory on top of the existing non-private SIGMA-I
key-exchange protocol supported by Vanadium.
8If we use the variant of our private mutual authentication protocol that provides unlinkability (Figure 2), the server
needs to perform a prefix-based encryption on every handshake. In our case, prefix-based encryption is just IBE
encryption. Based on the micro-benchmarks from Table 1, the extra (per-policy) overhead is just a few hundred
milliseconds on the small devices and under 10 milliseconds on the laptops and desktops.
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Intel Edison Raspberry Pi 2 Nexus 5X Laptop Desktop
SIGMA-I 252.1 ms 88.0 ms 91.6 ms 6.3 ms 5.3 ms
Private Mutual Auth. 1694.3 ms 326.1 ms 360.4 ms 19.6 ms 9.5 ms
Slowdown 6.7x 3.7x 3.9x 3.1x 1.8x
Table 2: Private mutual authentication benchmarks.
Deployment. We implemented the private mutual authentication protocol from Section 4 within
the Vanadium RPC system. Prior to our work, the RPC system only supported the SIGMA-I [Kra03,
CK02] protocol for mutual authentication, which does not provide privacy for services. We im-
plemented our private mutual authentication protocol to offer a “private mode” for Vanadium
services.
6.3 Private Discovery
We also integrated the private discovery protocol from Section 5 into Vanadium.
Benchmarks. We benchmark the cryptographic overhead of processing service advertisements,
and measure the size of the service advertisements. Processing service advertisements requires a
single IBE decryption and one ECDSA signature verification. This cost can be estimated ana-
lytically from Table 1 and standard ECDSA benchmarks. For instance, on the Nexus 5X smart-
phone, which is a typical client for processing service advertisements, the cost is approximately
236 ms (IBE decryption) + 11 ms (ECDSA signature verification) = 247 ms.
The advertisement size can also be estimated analytically. From Figure 3, our service adver-
tisement has the following form:
bid,PE.Enc(πS , (idS , g
s, sigS(bid, idS , g
s)))
Our implementation of prefix encryption (PE.Enc) has a ciphertext overhead9 of 208 bytes on top
of the plaintext. The Diffie-Hellman exponent (gs) is 32 bytes, the broadcast id (bid) is 16 bytes,
the ECDSA signature is 64 bytes, and a certificate chain (idS) of length three is approximately 500
bytes in size. The overall service advertisement is about 820 bytes.
Deployment. We deploy our service discovery protocol within the Vanadium discovery frame-
work. The protocol allows services to advertise themselves while restricting visibility to an autho-
rized set of clients. The Vanadium discovery API allows services to advertise over both mDNS and
BLE. An mDNS TXT record has a maximum size of 1300 bytes [CK13a, CK13b], which suffices for
service advertisements. Some care must be taken to ensure that the mDNS hostname and service
label do no leak any private information about the service. For instance, we set the service label
to vanadium private. tcp.local and hide the actual service type and instance name.
9This includes the size of the BB2 ciphertext and the overhead of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation. The dclxvi
library uses an optimized floating-based representation [NNS10] of points on the elliptic curve, which is not very
space-efficient. By representing the points directly as one (using point compression [Jiv14]) or two field elements, it
is possible to significantly reduce this overhead.
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When the policy has multiple prefixes, our advertisements would no longer fit in a single mDNS
TXT record. Furthermore, BLE advertisement payloads are restricted to 31 bytes [BLE14], which
is far too small to fit a full service advertisement.
We can address this by running an auxiliary service (over GATT or peer-to-peer WiFi as
in Apple AirDrop) to host the encrypted advertisement for the main service, and advertise the
endpoint of this auxiliary service over BLE. The privacy of the main service is unaffected since the
endpoint of the auxiliary service reveals nothing about it.
Encrypted service advertisements can only be interpreted by authorized clients. Thus, these
advertisements can also be served by members of the network other than the service itself. A
volunteering node may choose to cache the encrypted private service advertisements it sees on the
network (for example, any advertisement within radio range) and serve them to clients. Clients can
fetch advertisements for multiple services in the network in a single round-trip to the volunteer,
without having to connect to each advertising device. While such volunteer caching nodes imply
additional infrastructure, the key point is that their presence improves overall communication and
power efficiency in the network without any loss of privacy to the advertising services or their
clients.
6.4 Fixing AirDrop
Recall from Section 2.1 that during an AirDrop file exchange in contacts-only mode, a hash of the
sender’s identity is advertised over BLE and matched by potential receivers against their contacts.
If there is a match, the receiver starts a service that the sender can connect to using TLS (version
1.2). In the TLS handshake, the sender and receiver exchange their certificates in the clear, which
makes them visible to eavesdroppers on the network. This privacy vulnerability can be fixed using
the private mutual authentication protocol from Section 4. In particular, once the receiver matches
the sender’s hash against one of its contacts, it uses the prefix encryption scheme to encrypt its
identity under the name of the contact that matched the sender’s hash. This ensures that the
receiver’s identity is only shared with the intended contact, even in the presence of active network
attackers.10 To deploy this protocol, Apple would provision all AirDrop-enabled devices with a
secret key extracted for their identity in addition to their existing iCloud certificates. Apple would
be the IBE root in this case.
7 Extensions
In this section, we describe several ways to extend our private mutual authentication and service
discovery protocols to provide additional properties such as policy-hiding, delegation of decryption
capabilities, and support for more complex authorization policies.
Policy-hiding authentication and discovery. A limitation of our private mutual authenti-
cation and service discovery protocols from Sections 4 and 5 is that the server’s authorization
policy is revealed to a network attacker. One solution to this problem is to use a “policy-hiding”
prefix encryption scheme, where ciphertexts hide the prefix to which they are encrypted. This is
10The privacy guarantee for the sender is not as robust as information about its identity leaks via the hash advertised
over BLE.
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possible if we build the prefix encryption scheme from an anonymous IBE scheme such as Boneh-
Franklin [BF01]. In anonymous IBE, ciphertexts do not reveal their associated identity, and thus,
we achieve policy-hiding encryption. A drawback of the Boneh-Franklin scheme is that it requires
evaluating a pairing during both encryption and decryption, thus increasing the computational cost
over the BB2 IBE scheme, where a pairing is only needed during decryption.
Delegating decryption abilities. In our current framework, only IBE roots can issue identity
keys to principals. But there are many natural scenarios where non-root identities should also
be able to issue identity keys. For example, an identity provider might issue Alice a certificate
chain for the name IDP/User/Alice. While Alice can now issue certificates for child domains like
IDP/User/Alice/Phone, she cannot extract an identity key for the child domain. As a result,
delegation of decryption capabilities must still go through the IBE root for Alice’s domain. To
allow Alice to issue identity keys corresponding to derivatives (i.e., further extensions) of her name,
we can use a hierarchical IBE scheme [GS02, HL02] to construct the underlying prefix encryption
scheme. In hierarchical IBE, a principal holding a key for an identity A/B/ is able to issue keys for
any derivative identity A/B/C. This allows principals to independently manage their own subdomain
without needing to go through a central identity provider.
Complex authorization policies. Our private mutual authentication and service discovery
protocols support authorization policies that can be formulated as prefix constraints. While these
are a very natural class of policies for the SDSI model, there are scenarios that may require a more
diverse set of policies. For example, a server’s authorization policy might require that the client’s
user ID be between 0 and 100. While such range queries can be expressed using a (large) number of
prefixes, the size of the server’s broadcast message grows with the number of prefixes in the policy.
One way of supporting a more complex set of policies is to use a more general encryption scheme,
such as an attribute-based encryption (ABE) [SW05, BSW07, GVW13, BGG+14, GVW15]. For
instance, if the policies can be expressed as Boolean formulas, then the Bethencourt et al. ABE
scheme [BSW07] provides an efficient solution from pairings. Supporting more complicated policies
is possible using lattice-based methods [GVW13, BGG+14, GVW15], but this increased expressivity
comes at the expense of performance.
8 Related Work
In this section, we survey some of the existing work on developing private mutual authentication
and service discovery protocols.
Private mutual authentication. The term “private authentication” was first introduced by
Abadi and Fournet [Aba03, AF04]. These papers define a privacy property for authentication
protocols and the challenges associated with achieving it. Their definition of privacy is similar
to the one we describe in Section 2.2 and states that the identity of each protocol participant is
revealed to its peer only if the peer is authorized by the participant. In [AF04], Abadi and Fournet
introduce two private authentication protocols and formally analyze them in the applied pi calculus.
In addition to showing privacy, they also show that their protocol achieves unlinkability. While
our private mutual authentication protocol shown in Figure 1 does not provide unlinkability, the
variant described in Section 4.1 (shown in Figure 2) does achieve unlinkability.
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A key difference between our work and [AF04] is the fact that we support prefix-based autho-
rization policies. The protocols in [AF04] require the authorization policy to be specified by a set of
public keys and do not scale when the set of public keys is very large. Moreover, in their protocol,
clients and servers must either maintain (potentially long) lists of public keys for authorized peers,
or look up a peer’s public key in a directory service before each authentication request. In contrast,
using IBE both enables support for more expressive authorization policies and eliminates the need
to either maintain lists of public keys or run a public-key directory service.
Many other cryptographic primitives have also been developed for problems related to private
mutual authentication, including secret handshakes [BDS+03, JKT06, AKB07], oblivious signature-
based envelopes [LDB05], oblivious attribute certificates [LL06], hidden credentials [HBSO03,
FAL04, BHS04], and more.
Secret handshakes and their extensions are protocols based on bilinear pairings that allow
members of a group to identify each other privately. A key limitation of secret handshakes is
that the parties can only authenticate using credentials issued by the same root authority. Obliv-
ious signature-based envelopes [LDB05], oblivious attribute certificates [LL06] and hidden cre-
dentials [HBSO03, FAL04, BHS04] allow a sender to send an encrypted message that can be
decrypted only by a recipient that satisfies some policy. Hidden credentials additionally hide
the sender’s policy. Closely related are the cryptographic primitives of attribute-based encryp-
tion [BSW07, GVW13] and predicate encryption [KSW08, GVW15], which allow more fine-grained
control over decryption capabilities.
The protocols we have surveyed here are meant for authentication, and not authenticated key-
exchange, which is usually the desired primitive. Integrating these protocols into existing key-
exchange protocols such as SIGMA or TLS 1.3 is not always straightforward and can require non-
trivial changes to existing protocols. In contrast, our work shows how IBE-based authentication can
be very naturally integrated with existing secure key-exchange protocols (with minimal changes)
to obtain private mutual authentication. Moreover, our techniques are equally applicable in the
service discovery setting, and can be used to obtain 0-RTT private mutual authentication.
Service discovery. There is a large body of work on designing service discovery protocols for
various environments—mobile, IoT, enterprise and more; we refer to [ZMN05] for a survey. Broadly,
these protocols can be categorized into two groups: “directory-based” protocols and “directory-free”
protocols.
In directory-based discovery protocols [CZH+99, ZMB+10, Jin13], there is a central directory
that maintains service information and controls access to the services. Clients query directories
to discover services while services register with the directory to announce their presence. While
directory-based protocols allow for centralized management and tend to be computationally effi-
cient, their main drawback is that they force dependence on an external service. If the directory
service is unavailable then the protocol ceases to work. Even worse, if the directory service is
compromised, then both server and client privacy is lost. Besides, mutually suspicious clients and
servers may not be able to agree on a common directory service that they both trust. In light of
these downsides, we designed decentralized, peer-to-peer protocols in this work.
Directory-free protocols, such as [KW14a, KW14b, ZMN04, ZMN06], typically rely on a shared
key established between devices in a separate, out-of-band protocol. The shared key is then used to
encrypt the private service advertisements so that only paired devices can decrypt. Other protocols
like UPnP [Ell02] rely on public key encryption, where each device maintains a set of public keys
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for the peers it is willing to talk to. In contrast, key-management in our IBE-based solution is
greatly simplified—devices do not have to maintain long lists of symmetric or public keys. Our
protocol is similar to the Tryst protocol [PGM+07], which proposes using an anonymous IBE
scheme for encrypting under the peer’s name (based on using a mutually agreed upon convention).
A distinguishing feature of our protocol over Tryst is the support for prefix-based authorization
policies.
9 Conclusion
Automatic service discovery is an integral component of the Internet of Things. While numerous
service discovery protocols exist, few provide any notion of privacy. Motivated by the privacy
shortcomings of the Apple AirDrop protocol, we introduce several important security and privacy
goals for designing service discovery protocols for both IoT and mobile applications. We then
show how to combine off-the-shelf identity-based encryption with existing key-exchange protocols
to obtain both a private mutual authentication and a private service discovery protocol. Our
benchmarks on the various devices show that our protocols are viable for a wide range of practical
deployments and IoT scenarios.
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A Additional Preliminaries
In this section, we review some additional preliminaries.
Identity-based encryption. Identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84, BF01, Coc01, BB04] is
a generalization of public-key encryption where the public keys can be arbitrary strings, called
identities. An IBE scheme consists of four algorithms:
• Setup. Setup(1λ) takes the security parameter λ and outputs a master public key mpk and
a master secret key msk.
• Extract. Extract(msk, id) takes msk and an identity id and outputs an identity secret key
skid.
• Encrypt. Encrypt(mpk, id,m) takes mpk, an identity id, and a message m and outputs a
ciphertext ct.
• Decrypt. Decrypt(skid,ct) takes ct and skid and outputs a message m or a special symbol
⊥.
The correctness requirement for an IBE scheme states that for all messages m, identities id and
keys (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ), if sk ← Extract(msk, id) and ct ← Encrypt(mpk, id,m), then
Decrypt(sk,ct) = m. In this work, we require IBE schemes that are secure against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA-secure).
IBE security. We now present the formal game-based definition for adaptive-CCA security in
the context of an IBE scheme [BF01]. First, we define the IND-ID-CCA security game between an
adversary A and a challenger. In the following, we let λ denote the security parameter. The game
consists of several phases:
• Setup phase: The challenger samples parameters (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ), and sends mpk
to A.
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• Pre-challenge phase: The adversary can adaptively make key extraction and decryption
queries to the challenger. In a key-extraction query, the adversary submits an identity id.
The challenger replies with an identity key skid ← Extract(msk, id). In a decryption query,
the adversary submits a ciphertext ct and an identity id. The challenger then extracts an
identity key skid ← Extract(msk, id) and replies with Decrypt(skid,ct).
• Challenge phase: Once the adversary has finished making queries in the pre-challenge
phase, it outputs two equal-length messages m¯0 and m¯1 along with a target identity id (id
must not have appeared in any of the adversary’s extraction queries in the pre-challenge
phase). The challenger chooses a random bit b
r
←− {0, 1} and replies with a ciphertext ct←
Encrypt(mpk, id, m¯b).
• Post-challenge phase: In the post-challenge phase, the adversary can continue to make
extraction and decryption queries as in the pre-challenge phase. However, it cannot request
a key for the target identity id or request a decryption of the challenge ciphertext ct under
identity id.
• Output phase: At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. We say the
adversary “wins” the IND-ID-CCA game if b′ = b.
Definition A.1 (IND-ID-CCA Security [BF01]). An IBE scheme (Setup,Encrypt,Decrypt,Extract) is
IND-ID-CCA-secure if no efficient adversary can win the IND-ID-CCA security game with probability
that is non-negligibly greater than 1/2.
Additional cryptographic primitives. We also review some standard cryptographic defini-
tions for pseudorandom generators (PRGs), pseudorandom functions (PRFs), strong randomness
extractors, and authenticated encryption. Below, we write negl(λ) to denote a negligible function
in the security parameter λ.
Definition A.2 (Pseudorandom Generator [Yao82, BM82]). A pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1}ℓ →
{0, 1}n where ℓ = ℓ(λ), n = n(λ), ℓ < n is secure if for all efficient adversaries A,
∣∣∣Pr
[
s
r
←− {0, 1}ℓ : A(1λ, G(s)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
z
r
←− {0, 1}n : A(1λ, z) = 1
]∣∣∣ = negl(λ).
Definition A.3 (Pseudorandom Function [GGM84]). A pseudorandom function F : K×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m with key space K, domain {0, 1}n and range {0, 1}m is secure if for all efficient adversaries
A,
∣∣∣Pr
[
k
r
←− K : AF (k,·)(1λ) = 1
]
− Pr
[
f
r
←− Funs[{0, 1}n, {0, 1}m] : Af(·)(1λ) = 1
]∣∣∣ = negl(λ),
where Funs[{0, 1}n, {0, 1}m ] denotes the set of all functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m.
Definition A.4 (Strong Randomness Extractor [NZ96, adapted]). A function E : K × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m is a strong randomness extractor if for all adversaries A,
∣∣∣Pr
[
k
r
←− K, x
r
←− {0, 1}n : A(1λ, k, E(k, x)) = 1
]
−
Pr
[
k
r
←− K, z
r
←− {0, 1}m : A(1λ, k, z) = 1
] ∣∣∣ = negl(λ).
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Definition A.5 (Authenticated Encryption [BN00]). A symmetric-key encryption scheme (Encrypt,
Decrypt) over a key space K, a message space M, and a ciphertext space C is an authenticated
encryption scheme if it satisfies the following properties:
• Correctness: For all messages m ∈M,
Pr
[
k
r
←− K : Decrypt(k,Encrypt(k,m)) = m
]
= 1− negl(λ).
• Semantic Security (IND-CPA): For all efficient adversaries A,
∣∣∣∣Pr
[
k
r
←− K, b
r
←− {0, 1}; b′ ← ALoR(k,b,·,·)(1λ) : b′ = b
]
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣ = negl(λ),
where LoR(k, b,m0,m1) is the “left-or-right” encryption oracle which on input a key k ∈ K,
a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and two messages m0,m1 ∈M, outputs Encrypt(k,mb).
• Ciphertext Integrity: For all efficient adversaries A,
Pr
[
k
r
←− K;ct← AEncrypt(k,·)(1λ) : ct /∈ Q ∧ Decrypt(k,ct) 6= ⊥
]
= negl(λ),
where Q is the set of ciphertexts output by the Encrypt oracle.
Key derivation. A key derivation function (KDF) [DGH+04, Kra10] is an algorithm for ex-
tracting randomness from some non-uniform entropy source to obtain a uniformly random string
suitable for use in other cryptographic primitives. For our private mutual authentication protocol
in Figure 1, the key-derivation function is implemented by a hash function: KDF(gx, gy , gxy) =
H(gx, gy, gxy), and our security analysis relies on the hardness of the Hash Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion [ABR01] (described below). For our private service discovery protocol, we defer an explicit
description of our key-derivation procedure to Appendix E, where we provide a formal analysis of
our protocol.
Cryptographic assumptions. We now state the Diffie-Hellman-type assumptions [ABR01] we
use to show security of our protocols. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p with generator
g, and let H : G → Z be a hash function from G to an output space Z . Then, the Hash Diffie-
Hellman (Hash-DH) assumption in G states that the following distributions are computationally
indistinguishable:
(g, gx, gy,H(gx, gy , gxy)) and (g, gx, gy, z),
where x, y
r
←− Zp and z
r
←− Z . The Strong Diffie-Hellman (Strong-DH) assumption in G states
that computing gxy is hard given (g, gx, gy) where x, y
r
←− Zp, even if the adversary is given access
to a verification oracle O(g, gx, ·, ·). The verification oracle O outputs 1 if the input (g, gx, gy , gz)
is a decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) tuple (z = xy mod p) and 0 otherwise. In other words, the
Strong-DH assumption states that the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard even
with access to a (restricted) DDH oracle.
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B Key-Exchange Security
In this section, we describe the Canetti-Krawczyk model of key-exchange (KE) in the “post-
specified” peer setting [CK02, Kra03]. In the post-specified peer setting, a peer’s identity is possibly
unavailable at the beginning of the KE protocol. Instead, the identity of the peer is revealed during
the KE protocol. For example, at the beginning of the KE protocol, the client might only know
the server’s IP address and nothing more about the identity of the server. By participating in
the KE protocol, the client learns the identity of the server. Earlier works on key exchange have
also considered the “pre-specified” peer setting [BR93a, Sho99, CK01], where the peer’s identity is
assumed to be known at the beginning of the protocol. Our description in this section is largely
taken from the description in [CK02].
Following earlier works [BR93a, BCK98], Canetti and Krawczyk [CK01, CK02, Kra03] model
a KE protocol as a multi-party protocol where each party can run one or more instances of the
protocol. At the beginning of the protocol execution experiment, the challenger sets up the long-
term secrets for each party (as prescribed by the protocol specification). Then, the adversary is
given control of the protocol execution. In particular, the adversary can activate parties to run an
instance of the key-exchange protocol called a session. Each session is associated with a session
identifier. Within a session, parties can be activated to either initiate a session, or to respond to
an incoming message. The purpose of the session is to agree on a session key with another party in
the network (called the peer) by exchanging a sequence of messages. Sessions can run concurrently,
and messages are directed to the session with the associated session identifier.
In the post-specified model, a party can be activated to initiate a KE session by a tuple (P, sid, d),
where P is the party at which the session is activated, sid is a unique session identifier, and d is
a “destination address” used only for the delivery of messages for session sid. In particular, d
has no bearing on the identity of the peer. A party can be activated as either an initiator or as
a responder (e.g., to respond to an initialization message from another party). The output of a
completed KE session at a party P consists of a public tuple (P, sid, Q) as well as a secret value
atk, where sid is the session id, Q is the peer of the session, and atk is the application-traffic (or
session) key. In addition, sessions can be aborted without producing a session key. We denote
the output of an aborted session with a special symbol ⊥. When the session produces an output
(as a result of completing or aborting), its local state is erased. Only the tuple (P, sid, Q) and
the application-traffic key atk persists at the conclusion of the session. Each party may also have
additional long-term state such as a signature signing key. These long-term secrets are shared
across multiple sessions and are not considered to be a part of a party’s local session state. In the
protocol analysis, we will uniquely identify sessions by a pair (P, sid), where P is the local party
and sid is the session identifier.
Attacker model. The attacker is modeled to capture realistic attack capabilities in an open
network. In particular, the attacker has full control over the network communication, and moreover,
is allowed access to some of the secrets used or generated by the key-exchange protocol. More
precisely, the attacker is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time machine with full control over
the network. It is free to intercept, delay, drop, inject, or tamper with messages sent between the
parties. In addition, the attacker can activate parties (as either an initiator or a responder) to
begin an execution of the KE protocol. The attacker can also issue the following session exposure
queries to learn ephemeral and long-term secrets held by the parties:
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• StateReveal: The adversary can issue a StateReveal query against any incomplete session. It
is then given the local state associated with the targeted session. Importantly, the local state
does not contain long-term secrets such as signature signing keys which are shared across
multiple sessions involving the same party.
• KeyReveal: The adversary can issue a KeyReveal query against any completed session. It is
then given the application-traffic key atk associated with the targeted session.
• Corrupt: The adversary can issue a Corrupt query on any party P , at which point it learns all
information in the memory of P , including any long-term secrets. After corrupting a party
P , the adversary dictates all subsequent actions by P .
Note that the adversary in this model is fully adaptive.
Security definition. To define the security of a KE protocol, Canetti and Krawczyk give an
indistinguishability-based definition that intuitively states that an adversary cannot distinguish
the real session key output by an session from a uniformly random session key. However, since the
adversary has the ability to make session-exposure queries, this definition is only meaningful if the
power of the adversary is restricted. In particular, the adversary can only try to distinguish the
session key for sessions (P, sid) on which it did not issue one of the three session-exposure queries
defined above (otherwise, it can trivially distinguish the session key from a uniformly random
key). Formally, if the adversary makes a session-exposure query on (P, sid), the session (P, sid) is
considered exposed. Moreover, any sessions that “match” (P, sid) are also considered to be exposed.
This restriction is necessary since the matching session also computes the same session key (in an
honest execution of the protocol), thus allowing again a trivial distinguishing attack. In the post-
specified model, a session (Q, sid) matches a completed session with public output (P, sid, Q) if the
session (Q, sid) is incomplete or if the session (Q, sid) completes with public output (Q, sid, P ).
To be more precise, at any point in the indistinguishability game, the adversary can issue a Test
query on any completed session (P, sid). Let (P, sid, Q) be the public output and atk be the secret
output by this session. The challenger then sets k0 = atk and k1
r
←− K, where K is the key-space
for the session key. The challenger then chooses a bit b
r
←− {0, 1} and gives the adversary kb. The
adversary can continue making session exposure queries as well as activate sessions and interact
with the parties after making the Test query. At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a bit
b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary wins the distinguishing game if b′ = b. An adversary is admissible if
the session (P, sid) and all sessions matching (P, sid, Q) are unexposed. We now state the formal
security definition from [CK02, Kra03].
Definition B.1 (Key-exchange security [CK02, Kra03]). A key-exchange protocol π is secure if
for all efficient and admissible adversaries A, the following properties hold:
1. Suppose a session (P, sid) completes at an uncorrupted party P with public output (P, sid, Q)
and secret output atk. Then, with overwhelming probability, if Q completes session (Q, sid)
while P and Q are uncorrupted, the public output of (Q, sid) is (Q, sid, P ), and the secret
output is atk.
2. The probability that A wins the test-session distinguishing game is negligibly close to 1/2.
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B.1 Service Discovery Model
In Section 5, we introduced a private service discovery protocol that consisted of two sub-protocols:
a broadcast protocol where the server announced its identity and other relevant endpoint informa-
tion, and a 0-RTT mutual authentication protocol. In this section, we describe how we can extend
the Canetti-Krawczyk key-exchange framework to also reason about the security of the service
discovery protocol.
One major difference in the service discovery setting is that multiple clients can legitimately
respond to the server’s broadcast message and initiate handshakes with the server. In contrast, in
the mutual authentication setting, all messages sent between clients and servers are intended for a
single peer. Thus, the server’s broadcast message might include “semi-static” secrets that persist
for the lifetime of the broadcast message (which might include more than one session). In our
security model, the servers can maintain three kinds of state: local session state that persists for
a single session, semi-static state that persists for the lifetime of a broadcast, and long-term state
that persists across multiple broadcasts.
In the service discovery setting, the adversary is allowed to activate servers to produce a broad-
cast message. Specifically, a server can be activated to construct a broadcast message by a tuple
(P, bid) where P is the party being activated, and bid is a unique broadcast identifier. Next, the
adversary can activate parties to respond to a broadcast message by providing a tuple (P, bid, sid)
along with a broadcast message. Here, P identifies the party that is being activated to initiate
a key-exchange protocol, bid is the broadcast identifier, and sid is a session specific identifier. In
contrast to the basic key-exchange model, the session activation tuple does not include a desti-
nation address. It is assumed that the server’s discovery broadcast already includes the relevant
endpoint information. In the broadcast setting, the pair (bid, sid) is taken to be the unique session
identifier. The output of a successful key-exchange session at a party P consists of a public tuple
(P, bid, sid, Q), where (bid, sid) identifies the session and Q is the peer of the session, as well as a
secret application-traffic key atk. As in the key-exchange setting, sessions can also abort without
producing any output. When a local session completes (either successfully or due to aborting), the
local session state is erased. Moreover, whenever a server is activated to initialize a new broadcast,
its previous broadcast state is also erased. In the subsequent protocol analysis, we will uniquely
identify broadcasts by a pair (P, bid) and sessions by a triple (P, bid, sid).
In the service discovery setting, the adversary’s goal is still to distinguish the session key output
by a completed session from a session key that is chosen uniformly at random. In addition, we
allow the adversary an additional query that allows it to learn any semi-static secrets that persist
for the lifetime of a particular broadcast:
• BroadcastReveal: The adversary can issue a BroadcastReveal query against any server that has
initiated a broadcast. The adversary is given any semi-static state the server is maintaining
for the lifetime of its current broadcast. However, the adversary is not given any long-term
secrets such as signing keys which persist between broadcasts.
Admissibility requirements. In the key-exchange security game, it was necessary to impose
restrictions on the adversary’s power to prevent it from trivially winning the security game. The
same holds in the discovery setting. Specifically, we say a session (P, bid, sid) is “exposed” if the
adversary makes the following queries:
• The adversary makes a KeyReveal query on (P, bid, sid).
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• The adversary makes a Corrupt query on P before the session (P, bid, sid) has expired.
• P is the initiator of the key-exchange protocol (the client), and the adversary had made a
StateReveal query on (P, bid, sid).
• P is the responder in the key-exchange protocol (the server), and the adversary has made
both a StateReveal query on (P, bid, sid), and either a BroadcastReveal query on (P, bid) or a
Corrupt query on P before (P, bid) has expired.
Moreover, when the adversary makes one of the above queries and exposes a session, all “matching”
sessions are also marked as exposed. We adapt the definition from the basic key-exchange setting:
a session (Q, bid, sid) matches a completed session with public output (P, bid, sid, Q) if (Q, bid, sid)
is incomplete or if (Q, bid, sid) completes with public output (Q, bid, sid, P ).
We give some intuition about the exposure conditions. The last requirement effectively states
that in the case of server compromise, as long as one of the semi-static secret (from the broadcast)
and the ephemeral session-specific secret is not compromised, the adversary cannot learn anything
about the negotiated key. The above definition also captures perfect forward secrecy since the
adversary is allowed to corrupt parties after the expiration of the test session.
We can now define security for the service discovery protocol in the same manner as we defined
key-exchange security for a mutual authentication protocol (Definition B.1):
Definition B.2 (Service discovery security). A service discovery protocol π is secure if for all
efficient and admissible adversaries A, the following properties hold:
1. Suppose a session (P, bid, sid) completes at an uncorrupted party P with public output
(P, bid, sid, Q) and secret output atk. Then, with overwhelming probability, if Q completes
session (Q, bid, sid) while P and Q are uncorrupted, the public output of (Q, bid, sid) is
(Q, bid, sid, P ), and the secret output is atk.
2. The probability that A wins the test-session distinguishing game is negligibly close to 1/2.
C Key-Exchange Privacy
In this section, we formally define our notion of privacy for a key-exchange protocol. Intuitively,
we say a protocol is private if no efficient client or server is able to learn anything about another
party’s identity unless they satisfy that party’s authorization policy. This property should hold
even if the adversary corrupts multiple parties; as long as none of the corrupted parties satisfy the
target’s authorization policy, then they should not learn anything about the target’s identity. More
formally, we operate in the Canetti-Krawczyk key-exchange model, but make several modifications
to the adversary’s capabilities and its objectives. We now describe our model formally.
Formal definition. Let n be the number of parties participating in the protocol execution ex-
periment. We denote the parties P1, . . . , Pn. In addition to the n parties, we also introduce a
special test party PT whose identity will be hidden from the adversary at the beginning of the
protocol execution experiment. We now define two experiments Expt0 and Expt1. For b ∈ {0, 1},
the experiment Exptb proceeds as follows:
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• Setup phase: At the beginning of the experiment, the adversary submits a tuple of distinct
identities (id1, . . . , idn) and two challenge identities id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T (distinct from id1, . . . , idn).
For each i ∈ [n], the challenger sets up the long-term secrets for party Pi. For instance,
depending on the protocol specifications, the challenger might issue a certificate binding
the credentials for Pi to its identity idi. The challenger associates the identity id
(b)
T with
the special party PT , and performs the setup procedure for PT according to the protocol
specification.
• Protocol execution: In this phase, the adversary is free to activate any party (P1, . . . , Pn
and PT ) to initiate sessions and respond to session messages. When the adversary activates
a party P to initiate a session (P, sid), it can also specify a policy π(P,sid) associated with
the session (P, sid). Similarly, when the adversary activates a party Q as a responder, it can
specify a policy π(Q,sid) associated with the session (Q, sid). In addition, when the adversary
activates a party Q to respond to a session message for session (Q, sid), it also specifies the
sender’s policy. Party Q answers the query if and only if it satisfies the sender’s policy.
If the adversary does not specify a policy for a session (P, sid), the party P accepts all
connections. The adversary can also issue StateReveal, KeyReveal and Corrupt queries on any
party participating in the protocol execution (with the same semantics as in the key-exchange
security game described in Appendix B).
• Output phase: At the end of the protocol execution, the adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Intuitively, we will say that a key-exchange protocol is private if no efficient adversary can distin-
guish Expt0 from Expt1 with probability that is non-negligibly greater than 1/2. This captures the
property that no active network adversary is able to distinguish interactions with a party id
(0)
T from
those with a party id
(1)
T . Of course, as defined currently, an adversary can trivially win the security
game. Since we have not placed any restrictions on the adversary’s queries, it can, for instance,
corrupt the target party PT and learn its identity.
Admissibility requirements. To preclude trivial ways of learning the identity of the test party,
we enumerate a series of constraints on the adversary’s power. We say an adversary is “admissible”
for the privacy game if the following conditions hold:
• The adversary does not issue a Corrupt query on PT . In addition, the adversary does not
make a StateReveal query on any session (PT , sid) that completes.
• Whenever a session (PT , sid) completes with public output Q, then the adversary has not
made a StateReveal query on the session (Q, sid), and moreover, Q is not corrupt before the
completion of (PT , sid).
• Let ΠT denote the set of policies the adversary has associated with the test party PT . Let
I ⊆ [n] be the indices of the parties the adversary has corrupted in the course of the protocol
execution. Then, for all policies π ∈ ΠT and indices i ∈ I, it should be the case that idi does
not satisfy π.
• Whenever the adversary associated a policy π with a particular session (P, sid), it must be
the case that either id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T both satisfy π or neither satisfy π.
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These admissibility requirements are designed to rule out several “trivial” ways of breaking the
privacy of the test party PT in the protocol execution experiment. Certainly, if the adversary
corrupted the test party, or exposed (via a StateReveal or a Corrupt query) a completed session
(PT , sid), it can easily learn the identity of PT . These scenarios are captured by the first two
admissibility requirements. The third admissibility requirements states that the adversary never
corrupts a party who is authorized to talk with the test party. This is unavoidable because a
party is always willing to reveal its identity to any other party that satisfies its policy. Thus, if
the adversary obtained the credentials of a party that satisfied the test party’s policy, it should be
able to learn the test party’s identity. The final admissibility requirement captures the fact that we
work in the model where a network adversary can always tell whether a handshake completes or
aborts. Thus, if the adversary is allowed to choose the policies the protocol participants use, then
it must be constrained so it cannot choose a policy that allows it to trivially distinguish the two
test identities.
With these admissibility requirements, we now state our privacy definition for key-exchange
protocols.
Definition C.1 (Key-exchange privacy). A key-exchange protocol π is private if for all efficient
and admissible adversaries A, the probability that A outputs 1 in Expt0 is negligibly close to the
probability that it outputs 1 in Expt1.
The SIGMA-I protocol. To provide some additional intuition on the nature of our privacy
definition, we first show that the SIGMA-I protocol [Kra03, CK02] does not satisfy our notion of
privacy against active network attackers. Consider the case where we have two parties: P1 and the
test party PT . The adversary chooses an arbitrary identity id1 for P1 and two distinct identities
id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T for PT . The adversary activates P1 to initiate a session (P, sid), and forwards the
message (a DH share gx) to PT . The test party PT responds with its DH share g
y and an encryption
of its identity (along with other components) under an encryption key derived from gx and gy. At
this point in the protocol execution, none of the sessions have completed. The adversary now
performs a StateReveal query on P1 to learn x, from which it can derive the key PT used to encrypt
its message. Now, the adversary simply decrypts the response message from PT and recovers its
identity. Thus, we conclude that the original SIGMA-I protocol does not provide privacy in the
presence of an active network adversary.
D Analysis of Private Mutual Authentication Protocol
In this section, we show that the protocol in Figure 1 from Section 4 is a private mutual authenti-
cation protocol (satisfies both Definition B.1 and Definition C.1). In the following description, we
will often refer to the first message from the client to the server as the “initialization” message, the
server’s response as the “response” message, and the final message from the client as the “finish”
message.
Security. Security of our protocol follows directly from the security of the SIGMA-I protocol.
Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem D.1. The protocol in Figure 1 is a secure key-exchange protocol (Definition B.1) assum-
ing the Hash-DH assumption holds in G and the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives
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(the signature scheme and the authenticated encryption scheme).
Proof. As noted in Section 4, the two differences between our protocol and the SIGMA-I protocol
from [CK02] is that we use authenticated encryption to encrypt and authenticate the handshake
messages rather than separate encryption and MAC schemes. The other difference is that in
our protocol, the server substitutes a prefix-based encryption of its certificate chain for its actual
certificate chain in the response message to the client.
In the original SIGMA-I protocol, the requirement on the certificate chain is that it provides an
authenticated binding between an identity and its public verification key. An encrypted certificate
chain provides the exact same level of assurance. After all, an honest client only accepts the
server’s credential if the client successfully decrypts the encrypted certificate chain and verifies
the underlying certificate chain. Therefore, we can substitute encrypted certificate chain into the
SIGMA-I protocol with no loss in security. Security of our resulting protocol then follows directly
from security of the original SIGMA-I protocol [CK02, §5.3].
Privacy. We now show that our key-exchange protocol is private. In our analysis, we construct
the encryption scheme used to encrypt certificates from an IBE scheme as described in Section 3.1.
Privacy for the client’s identity then reduces to the security of the underlying key-exchange (since
the client encrypts its identity under a handshake secret key), while privacy for the server’s identity
reduces to CCA-security of the underlying IBE scheme (since the server encrypts its identity using
a prefix encryption scheme constructed from IBE).
Theorem D.2. The protocol in Figure 1 is private (Definition C.1) assuming the IBE scheme
used to construct the prefix encryption scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure, the Hash-DH assumption
holds in G, and the underlying cryptographic primitives (the signature scheme and the authenticated
encryption scheme) are secure.
Proof. We proceed using a hybrid argument. First, we define a simulator that will simulate the
role of the challenger for the adversary A in the protocol execution environment. Then, we specify
a sequence of hybrid experiments where we modify the behavior of the simulator.
Specifically, the simulator S takes as input the number of parties n, the security parameter λ,
and the adversary A, and plays the role of the challenger in the protocol execution experiment with
A. At the beginning of the simulation, A submits a tuple of identities (id1, . . . , idn) and two test
identities id
(0)
T , id
(1)
T . During the protocol execution, the simulator chooses the parameters for each
of the parties, and handles the responses to the adversary’s queries according to the specifications
of the particular hybrid experiment. We now define our sequence of hybrid experiments:
• Hybrid H0: This is the real experiment Expt0 (i.e., the simulator responds to the adversary’s
queries as described in Expt0).
• Hybrid H1: Same as H0, except whenever the test party PT is activated to process a server’s
response message, if all of the validation checks pass, the simulator uses the identity id
(1)
T in
place of id
(0)
T when constructing PT ’s finish message.
• Hybrid H2: This is the real experiment Expt1.
We now show that each consecutive pair of hybrid experiments is computationally indistinguishable.
This suffices to show that Expt0 and Expt1 are computationally indistinguishable, and correspond-
ingly, that the protocol in Figure 1 provides privacy.
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Claim D.3. Hybrids H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable if the Hash-DH assumption
holds in G and the underlying cryptographic primitives are secure.
Proof. Observe that H0 and H1 are identical experiments, except in H1, the finish messages sent
by the test party PT contain an encryption of the identity id
(1)
T under the handshake encryption
key htk instead of id
(0)
T . At a high level then, the claim follows from the fact that the SIGMA-I
protocol ensures confidentiality of the client’s finish message against active attackers [CK02, §5.3].
Specifically, Canetti and Krawczyk show that for any complete session (P, s,Q) that is not
exposed by the adversary (that is, neither this session nor its matching session (Q, sid) has been
corrupted by a StateReveal or a Corrupt query), breaking the semantic security of the information
encrypted under htk in the finish message of session (P, sid) implies a distinguisher between htk
and a random encryption key. This then implies an attack either on the handshake security of the
protocol or one of its underlying cryptographic primitives.
In our privacy model, the admissibility requirement stipulates that the test party PT is never
corrupted during the protocol execution. Suppose that in the protocol execution experiment, the
adversary activates PT to respond to a server’s message in a session (PT , sid) and PT responds
with a finish message (a ciphertext under the handshake key htk). Since PT is honest, if it sends
the finish message, then it also completes the session setup by outputting the tuple (PT , sid, Q).
Next, we use the fact that if (PT , sid) completes with peer Q, by the admissibility requirement,
the adversary must not have made a StateReveal query on (Q, sid) nor was Q corrupt before the
completion of (PT , sid). Thus, we can directly invoke the security properties of the SIGMA-I
protocol and argue that the handshake key htk used by PT to encrypt the finish message in session
(PT , sid) is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly random key. The claim then follows
by semantic security of the authenticated encryption scheme (strictly speaking, we require a hybrid
argument over each session where PT sends a finish message).
Claim D.4. Hybrid H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguishable if the IBE scheme used to
construct the prefix encryption scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure.
Proof. Let q be an upper bound on the number of sessions where A activates the test party PT
as the responder (the server) in the protocol execution experiment. We define a sequence of q + 1
intermediate hybrids H1,0, . . . ,H1,q where hybrid experiment H1,i is defined as follows:
• Hybrid H1,i: Same as H1, except the first i times that PT is activated as a responder, PT
substitutes the identity id
(1)
T for id
(0)
T in its response message. In all subsequent sessions where
PT is activated as a responder, it uses the identity id
(0)
T .
By construction, hybrid experiment H1 is identical to H1,0 and H2 is identical to H1,q. We now show
that for all i ∈ [q], hybrid H1,i−1 is computationally indistinguishable from hybrid H1,i, assuming
that the IBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure.
Claim D.5. For all i ∈ [q], hybrids H1,i−1 and H1,i are computationally indistinguishable assuming
that the IBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure.
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary that is able to distinguish H1,i−1 from H1,i. We show how to use
A to build an adversary B for the IND-ID-CCA-security. At the beginning of the IND-ID-CCA game,
algorithm B is given the public parameters mpk for the IBE scheme. It starts running adversary
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A and obtains a tuple of identities (id1, . . . , idn) and test identities id
(0)
T , id
(1)
T . Algorithm B then
simulates the setup procedure in H1. In particular, for each i ∈ [n], it chooses a signing and
verification key for each party Pi. In addition, it also issues a certificate binding the identity idi to
its associated signature verification key. Next, it prepares two certificates, one binding id
(0)
T to the
verification key for idT , and another binding id
(1)
T to the verification key for idT . Note that B does
not make any queries to the IBE extraction oracle, and thus, does not associate any IBE identity
keys with each party. We will describe how algorithm B is able to answer the queries consistently in
the simulation in spite of this fact. Finally, algorithm B gives mpk to A and the protocol execution
phase begins. Algorithm B simulates the response to each of adversary A’s queries as follows:
• Client initialization queries. These are handled exactly as in H1 and H2.
• Server response queries. When adversary A activates a party P to respond to a client
initialization query with some policy π, if P 6= PT , algorithm B simulates the response message
as in H1. This is possible because B chooses all of the parameters that appears in the response
message and also has the master public key mpk of the IBE scheme. If P = PT , then let ℓ be
the number of times A has already activated PT to respond to a client initialization message
in the protocol execution thus far. Then, algorithm B proceeds as follows:
– If ℓ < i − 1, then B constructs the response message as described in H2, that is, using
the identity id
(1)
T in the response message.
– If ℓ ≥ i, then B constructs the response message as described in H1, that is, using the
identity id
(0)
T in the response message.
– If ℓ = i − 1, then B submits the tuple (id
(0)
T , id
(1)
T ) with the policy π as its challenge
identity in the IBE security game. It receives a ciphertext ctS from the challenger.
Algorithm B constructs the rest of PT ’s response message as in H1 and H2 using ctS as
its encrypted certificate chain.
• Client response queries. When the adversary A delivers a message to a client session
(P, sid), B responds as follows:
1. Let πS be the sender’s policy associated with the message. If P 6= PT and idP does not
satisfy πS, B aborts the session. If P = PT and id
(0)
T does not satisfy πS, B aborts the
session. Recall that our admissibility requirement specifies that either id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T
both satisfy πS, or neither satisfy πS .
2. B parses the adversary’s message as (sid, gy ,ct). It checks that there is a local ses-
sion (P, sid), and aborts the protocol if not. Next, it derives the keys (htk, atk) =
KDF(gx, gy, gxy) where x is the ephemeral DH exponent it chose for session (P, sid). It
decrypts ct with htk and parses the result as a tuple (ctS , σS), again aborting the pro-
tocol if decryption fails or the resulting message has the wrong form. Finally, B checks
that πS is the actual policy associated with ctS , aborting the protocol if not.
3. If B is still in the pre-challenge phase or if B is in the post-challenge phase and either
ctS 6= ctS or πS 6= π¯ (where π¯ is the identity B submitted to the IBE challenger and
ctS is the ciphertext B received from the IBE challenger), then B queries the IBE de-
cryption oracle on ctS with identity πS to obtain a decrypted identity idQ. B performs
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the remaining checks as would be done in hybrids H1 and H2, and constructs the client’s
finish message in the same manner.
If B is in the post-challenge phase, ctS = ctS , and πS = π¯, then B aborts the ses-
sion if the identity id
(0)
T does not satisfies the policy associated with session (P, sid).
Recall again that under our admissibility requirement, either id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T both satisfy
the policy associated with session (P, sid), or neither satisfy the policy. If B does not
abort, then B verifies that the signature σS is a valid signature on (sid,ctS , gx, gy) where
gx, gy are the session id and ephemeral DH shares associated with session (P, sid). If the
signature verifies, then B constructs P ’s finish message as in H1 and H2.
• Server finish queries. These are handled exactly as in H1 and H2.
• StateReveal and KeyReveal queries. These are handled exactly as in H1 and H2.
• Corrupt queries. If A asks to corrupt a party P 6= PT (since A is admissible), B queries
the IBE extraction oracle for the secret keys for idP and each prefix of idP . It gives these
secret keys to A, the long-term signing key associated with idP , and any ephemeral secrets
for incomplete sessions currently in the local storage of P .
At the end of the game, A outputs a guess b′. Algorithm B echoes this guess.
To complete the proof, we first show that B is an admissible IBE adversary in the IND-ID-CCA-
security game. By construction, B never requests the challenger to decrypt the challenge ciphertext
under the challenge identity. It thus suffices to argue that B never queries the extraction oracle on
the challenge identity π¯. This follows by admissibility of A. In the above specification, algorithm
B only makes extraction queries when the adversary corrupts a party. By the admissibility require-
ment, none of the corrupted parties can satisfy any of the policies the adversary associated with
PT , which in particular, includes π¯. Thus, in the simulation, B never needs to issue an extraction
query for the identity π¯, and so, B is admissible.
Next, we show that if B receives an encryption of id
(0)
T from the IBE challenger in the challenge
phase, then it has perfectly simulated hybrid H1,i−1 for A and if it receives an encryption of id
(1)
T
from the IBE challenger, it has perfectly simulated H1,i for A. It is easy to verify that B correctly
simulates the client initialization, server finish, and exposure queries. For the server response
queries, B constructs the encrypted identity as prescribed by H1,i−1 when the IBE challenger replies
with an encryption of id
(0)
T . The encrypted identity is constructed as prescribed by H1,i when the
IBE challenger replies with an encryption of id
(1)
T .
Finally, we argue that B correctly simulates the client response queries. The only non-trivial
case is when the adversary submits ctS = ctS and πS = π¯. In all other cases, the behavior of
B is identical to that in the real scheme (unchanged between H1,i−1 and H1,i). In the case where
ctS = ctS and πS = π¯, then by construction, ctS is either a valid encryption of the identity id
(0)
T
or of id
(1)
T . By admissibility, the client’s policy in session (P, sid) either accepts both id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T ,
or rejects both. Thus, in the real experiment, the client’s decision to abort the session or continue
the handshake is independent of whether the server’s identity was id
(0)
T or id
(1)
T . The remainder
of the response processing is identical to that in the real scheme, so we conclude that B correctly
simulates the client’s behavior. The claim follows.
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Since each pair of hybrids H1,i−1 and H1,i for all i ∈ [q] are computationally indistinguishable under
the IND-ID-CCA-security of the IBE scheme, we conclude that H1 and H2 are computationally
indistinguishable.
Theorem D.2 now follows from Claims D.3 and D.4.
E Analysis of Private Service Discovery Protocol
In this section, we formally argue the security of our private service discovery protocol from Section 5
under Definition B.2. First, we give a more formal specification of the protocol in Figure 4. In
the subsequent sections, we demonstrate our discovery protocol is secure in our extended Canetti-
Krawczyk key-exchange model (Theorem E.1, Appendix E.1), that it provides 0-RTT security
(Theorem E.9, Appendix E.2), and that it provides privacy for both the client and the server
(Theorem E.10, Appendix E.3).
E.1 Key-Exchange Security
First, we show that the protocol in Figure 4 is a secure key-exchange protocol in the service-
discovery extension to the Canetti-Krawczyk key-exchange model from Appendix B.1. Specifically,
we prove the following theorem:
Theorem E.1. The protocol in Figure 4 is a secure service discovery protocol (Definition B.2) in
the random oracle model, assuming the Strong-DH assumption and the Hash-DH assumption hold
in G, as well as the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives (the signature scheme, the
PRG, the authenticated encryption scheme, and the extraction algorithm).
In the following, we show that the two properties in Definition B.2 hold for the key-exchange
protocol in Figure 4.
Proof of Property 1. Our proof of Property 2 (Appendix E.1.1) below will also show that
our service discovery protocol satisfies Property 1. In particular, we refer to hybrid arguments H0
through H3 in the proof of Property 2.
E.1.1 Proof of Property 2.
Following similar analysis of key-exchange protocols in [KPW13, KW15], we assume selective se-
curity in the adversary’s choice of the test session. In our case, we require that at the beginning of
the security game, the adversary commits to the following:
• The test session (P, bid, sid).
• The peer’s identity Q in the test session.
• Whether P is the initializer or the responder in the test session.
Note that selective security implies full adaptive security at a security loss that grows polynomially
in the number of parties and the number of sessions the adversary initiates (where the simulator
guesses the adversary’s test session at the beginning of the protocol execution experiment).
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Let G be a group where the Hash-DH and Strong-DH assumptions hold and let g be a generator for
G. Let H1,H2 be hash functions. Let PRG be a secure pseudorandom generator (PRG) with seed-space
K. Let Extract be a key-extraction algorithm with output space K. The key-extraction algorithm can be
instantiated with the HMAC-based key derivation function [KE10] like that used in the OPTLS protocol [KW15].
Server’s broadcast message:
bid, idS , g
s
, sigS(bid, idS, g
s)
Protocol messages:
Client Server
bid, sid, g
x
, {idS, idC , sigC(bid, sid, idS, idC , g
s
, g
x)}htk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
bid, sid, g
y
, {bid, sid, idS, idC , g
s
, g
x
, g
y}htk′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Broadcast description: When a server S is activated to broadcast a discovery message with broadcast id
bid, it erases any existing semi-static state (from a previous broadcast). It chooses s
r
←− Zp and outputs the
message (bid, idS , g
s, sigS(bid, idS, g
s)). The server stores the constant s together with its current broadcast id
bid. Without loss of generality, we assume that S never reuses a broadcast id (e.g., the broadcast ids must be
in ascending order).
Protocol actions:
1. When a party C is activated to initialize a session (bid, sid) with broadcast message (bid′, idS′ , g
s′ , σ′),
it first checks that bid = bid′ and that no previous session (C, bid, sid) has been initialized (aborting
the session if the checks fail). If the checks succeed, it looks up the verification key for the party S′
identified by idS′ and checks that σ
′ is a valid signature on the tuple (bid, idS′ , g
s′) under the public
key of idS′ . If any of the checks fail, C aborts the session. Otherwise, C chooses a random exponent
x
r
←− Zp, and computes k = H1(g
s′ , gx, gs
′x), (htk, htk′, exk) = PRG(k). It replies to S′ with the message
(bid, sid, gx, {idS′ , idC , sigC(bid, sid, idS′ , idC , g
s′ , gx)}htk). In addition, it stores its ephemeral exponent x,
the server’s identity idS′ and the server’s DH share g
s′ in the local state of session (C, bid, sid).
2. When a party S is activated as a responder with session id sid and a message of the form (bid′, sid′, gx
′
,ct′),
it looks up its current broadcast id bid and semi-static exponent s. Then, it checks that bid′ = bid,
sid
′ = sid, and no previous session (S, bid, sid) has been initialized (aborting the session if the checks
fail or there is no broadcast state). It then computes k = H1(g
s, gx
′
, gsx
′
), (htk, htk′, exk) = PRG(k),
and tries to decrypt ct′ with htk. If decryption succeeds (does not output ⊥), S parses the output as
(idS′ , idC′ , σ
′). It checks that idS′ = idS , and looks up the verification key for the party C
′ identi-
fied by idC′ . It verifies that σ
′ is a valid signature on (bid, sid, idS, idC′ , g
s, gx
′
) under the public key
of C′. If any of these checks fail, S aborts the protocol. Otherwise, it chooses an ephemeral expo-
nent y
r
←− Zp and computes atk = Extract(exk,H2(g
x′ , gy, gx
′y)). It replies to C′ with the message
(bid, sid, gy, {bid, sid, idS , idC′ , g
s, gx, gy}htk′). It also outputs the public tuple (S, bid, sid, C
′) and the se-
cret session key atk.
3. Upon receiving a response message of the form (bid′, sid′, gy
′
,ct′), the party C checks whether there
is a session (C, bid′, sid′). If not, C ignores the message. Otherwise, it loads the ephemeral con-
stant x, the server’s identity idS′ , and the server’s DH share g
s′ from its local storage, computes
k = H1(g
s′ , gx, gs
′x), (htk, htk′, exk) = PRG(k). It tries to decrypt ct′ with htk′. If ct′ successfully
decrypts to the tuple (bid′, sid′, idS′ , idC , g
s′ , gx, gy
′
), where x is the ephemeral exponent in the local
state of session (C, bid, sid), then C outputs the public tuple (C, bid′, sid′, S′) and the secret session key
atk = Extract(exk,H2(g
x, gy
′
, gxy
′
)). Otherwise, C aborts the protocol.
Figure 4: Formal specification of the private discovery protocol. We present the “non-private”
version of the service discovery protocol without the prefix-based encryption. In the private version,
the server’s broadcast is encrypted under a prefix encryption scheme to its policy.
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We begin by defining a simulator S = S(A). On input n (the number of parties), λ (a security
parameter) and an adversary A, the simulator S simulates a run of the security game for the mutual
authentication protocol. In the selective security setting, the adversary begins by committing to
a test session (P¯ , bid, sid), the peer Q¯ in the test session, and whether P¯ was the initiator or the
responder in the test session. Then, the simulator S initializes the n parties by choosing a private
signing key and a public verification key for each of the n parties. When A activates a party, the
simulator S performs the protocol actions (as described in Figure 4) on behalf of the parties, and
gives A the outgoing messages as well as the public output of each session.
Description of simulator. We now introduce several variants of the simulator S , which we
generically denote S¯ . The simulator S¯ behaves very similarly to S , except for the following differ-
ences.
1. At the beginning of the simulation, the simulator chooses three exponents s¯, x¯, y¯
r
←− Zp and
four keys htk, htk
′
, exk, atk ∈ K. The specification of htk, htk
′
, exk, atk will determine the
different variants of the simulator S¯ .
2. In the selective security model, the adversary commits to a test session (P¯ , bid, sid), the peer
Q¯, and the role of P¯ in the test session at the beginning of the experiment. For notational
convenience, let S¯ ∈
{
P¯ , Q¯
}
denote the server the adversary commits to for the test session
and similarly, let C¯ ∈
{
P¯ , Q¯
}
denote the client to which it commits.
The simulator S¯ simulates the execution of the key-exchange security game exactly as S ,
except for the following differences.
• If the adversary activates S¯ to initiate the broadcast (S¯, bid), the simulator uses s¯ as the
semi-static DH exponent in the broadcast.
• If the adversary activates C¯ to initiate the session (C¯, bid, sid), the simulator uses x¯ as
the ephemeral DH exponent in the start message.
• If the adversary activates S¯ as a responder to the session (S¯, bid, sid), the simulator uses
y¯ as the ephemeral DH exponent in the response message.
• It substitutes the keys htk, htk
′
, exk for the keys htk, htk′, exk whenever the DH shares
(gs¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯) are used to derive the keys during the simulation (that is, when the simulator
needs to compute the quantity PRG(H1(g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯))). Similarly, it uses atk in place of
atk whenever the shares (gx¯, gs¯, gy¯, gs¯x¯, gx¯y¯) are used to derive the session key (that is,
when the simulator needs to compute the quantity Extract(exk,H2(g
x¯, gy¯, gx¯y¯))).
3. At the end of the protocol, A outputs a bit. The simulator S¯ outputs the same bit.
Our security analysis consists of two main cases, depending on whether the adversary compromises
the server’s semi-static broadcast secret or not. Recall from our admissibility requirement that as
long as it is not the case that both the server’s ephemeral DH secret and the server’s semi-static
broadcast secret are compromised, we say the adversary is admissible. This is very similar to the
case analysis in [KW15]. More concretely, our two cases are given as follows:
• Case 1: The adversary neither issues a BroadcastReveal query on (S¯, bid) nor corrupts S¯
before (S¯, bid) expires.
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• Case 2: The adversary does not issue a StateReveal query on (S¯, bid).
For each case, we define a sequence of hybrid experiments, and then show that each consecutive pair
of hybrid experiments are computationally indistinguishable. Before we begin the case analysis, we
prove the following lemma.
Lemma E.2. Suppose a session (P, bid, sid) completes with a peer Q. Assume moreover that
neither P nor Q has been corrupted before the completion of (P, bid, sid). Then, assuming that sig
is a secure signature scheme (and that the certificates are authenticated), the following hold:
• If P is the client and Q is the server, then the adversary initiated a broadcast (Q, bid) and P
must have been activated to initiate a session (P, bid, sid) with the broadcast message output
by (Q, bid).
• If P is the server and Q is the client, the session (Q, bid, sid) cannot complete with a peer P ′
where P ′ 6= P .
Proof. We prove each claim separately:
• When P is activated to initialize a session (P, bid, sid) with a broadcast message (bid′, idS′ , g
s′ , σ′),
it first checks that bid′ = bid and that σ′ is a valid signature on (bid, idS′ , g
s′) under the pub-
lic key identified by idS′ . Since (P, bid, sid) completes with peer Q, it must be the case that
S′ = Q. Since Q has not been corrupted before the completion of (P, bid, sid), it signs at most
one broadcast message containing bid. Thus, if (P, bid, sid) completes with Q, it must have
been initialized with the broadcast message output by (Q, bid) since this is the only message
that contains a valid signature from Q with the broadcast id bid. Otherwise, A can be used
to break the security of the signature scheme sig.
• Since (P, bid, sid) completes with peer Q and P is the server, P must have received a message
containing a signature from Q on a tuple containing (bid, sid, idP , idQ). By assumption, Q
has not been corrupted before the completion of (P, bid, sid), so it would only sign a message
of this form if it was activated to initialize a session (Q, bid, sid). Otherwise, the adversary
must have forged a signature under Q’s signing key.
But if Q was activated to initiate the session (Q, bid, sid) and the session completes with
a peer P ′ 6= P , then the only signature that an honest Q would have produced that con-
tains the session identifier (bid, sid) is a signature on a tuple containing (bid, sid, idP ′ , idQ) 6=
(bid, sid, idP , idQ). In this case, an honest Q would never have signed any tuple containing
(bid, sid, idP , idQ). Thus, any adversary that can cause (P, bid, sid) to complete with peer
Q and have (Q, bid, sid) complete with peer P ′ can be used to forge signatures for sig (in
particular, under Q’s signing key).
We now consider the two possible cases, and argue that in each case, the adversary’s advantage in
distinguishing the session key of an unexposed session from random is negligible.
Case 1: s is not compromised. In this case, we rely on the security of the server’s broadcast
secret for the privacy of the session key. We now define our sequence of hybrid experiments:
• Hybrid H0: This is the real protocol execution experiment. Specifically, the simulator S¯
where (htk, htk
′
, exk) = PRG(H1(g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯)), and atk = Extract(exk,H2(g
x¯, gy¯, gx¯y¯)).
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• Hybrid H1: Same as hybrid H0, except S¯ also aborts ifA queriesH1 on the input (gs¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯).
• Hybrid H2: Same as hybrid H1, except htk, htk
′
, exk are uniformly random over K.
• Hybrid H3: Same as hybrid H2, except S¯ also aborts if the session (Q¯, bid, sid) does not
match (P¯ , bid, sid). In addition, S¯ also aborts if the session key output by the test session
(P¯ , bid, sid) is not atk.
• Hybrid H4: Same as hybrid H3, except atk is uniformly random over K.
We now show that each consecutive pair of hybrid experiments described above is computationally
indistinguishable.
Claim E.3. Hybrids H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable if the Strong-DH assumption
holds in G and H1 is modeled as a random oracle.
Proof. Let (P¯ , bid, sid) be the session, and Q¯ be the peer that the adversary commits to at the
beginning of the experiment. By definition, this means that (P¯ , bid, sid, Q¯) is the public output of
the test session.
Let A be a distinguisher between H0 and H1. We use A to build a Strong-DH adversary B as
follows. Algorithm B is given a Strong-DH challenge (g, gs¯, gx¯), as well as a DDH oracle O(gs¯, ·, ·)
where O(gα, gβ , gγ) = 1 if γ = αβ (mod p), and 0 otherwise. We now describe the operation of B.
In the security reduction, B will need to program the outputs of H1.
At the beginning of the simulation, algorithm B generates a private signing key along with a
public verification key (in the same manner as S¯) for each of the n parties. Algorithm B also
initializes two empty tables T1 and T2. The first table T1 is used to maintain the mapping from
tuples (gα, gβ , gγ) to random oracle outputs H1(g
α, gβ , gγ), and will be used for answering oracle
queries to H1. The second table T2 maps between group elements g
β and random oracle outputs
H1(g
s¯, gβ , gγ) where γ = s¯β (mod p). In other words, T2 maps between DDH tuples with first
component gs¯ and is used to answer KeyReveal queries consistently in the simulation.
Next, B chooses a random exponent y¯
r
←− Zp and a random value k
′ r←− K. It adds the mapping
[gx¯ 7→ k′] to T2, computes (htk, htk
′
, exk) = PRG(k′) and atk = Extract(exk,H2(g
x¯, gy¯ , gx¯y¯)).
Algorithm B then begins the simulation of the key-exchange security game for A. Algorithm
B responds to A’s actions as follows. Recall that in the selective security model, the adversary
commits to the initiator of the protocol at the beginning of the security game. In the following
description, we again write C¯ ∈
{
P¯ , Q¯
}
to denote the client in the test session, and S¯ ∈
{
P¯ , Q¯
}
to
denote the server in the test session.
• Broadcast queries. If the adversary activates S¯ to initiate the broadcast (S¯, bid), the
simulator uses gs¯ from the Strong-DH challenge as the semi-static DH share in the broad-
cast message. For other broadcast queries, algorithm B chooses a fresh DH exponent and
constructs the broadcast message exactly as in the real protocol.
• Client initialization queries. When A activates a party P to initiate a session (P, bid, sid),
if (P, bid, sid) 6= (C¯, bid, sid), B chooses a fresh DH exponent and prepares the message exactly
as in the real scheme.
Otherwise, if (P, bid, sid) = (C¯, bid, sid), B sets gx¯ from the Strong-DH challenge to be the
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DH share in its message. Next, B sets k = k′ and (htk, htk′, exk) = PRG(k), where k′ is the
key B chose at the beginning of the simulation. The remaining steps of the query processing
are handled exactly as in the real experiment.
• Server response queries. When A activates a server P to respond to a session (P, bid, sid),
if (P, bid) 6= (S¯, bid), then B chooses a fresh ephemeral DH exponent and constructs the re-
sponse message exactly as in the real scheme. Note that since it chose the semi-static DH
share for (P, bid), it can construct the broadcast message exactly as in the real protocol.
If (P, bid) = (S¯, bid), then let gx be the ephemeral DH share in the activation message.
Algorithm B checks if there is already a mapping gx 7→ k in table T2. If the mapping does not
exist, then B chooses a new key k
r
←− K and adds the mapping gx 7→ k to T2. Then, it derives
(htk, htk′, exk) = PRG(k) and verifies the activation message (exactly as prescribed in the real
protocol). If everything succeeds and sid = sid, algorithm B uses gy¯ (chosen at the beginning
of the experiment) as the ephemeral DH share when constructing its response. Otherwise, it
chooses a fresh ephemeral share and constructs the response as in the real scheme.
• Client finish queries. When a client receives a response message for session (P, bid, sid),
if (P, bid, sid) 6= (C¯, bid, sid), B constructs the outputs as prescribed by the real scheme (this
is possible since B chose the client’s ephemeral DH share in this case). If (P, bid, sid) =
(C¯, bid, sid), B proceeds as described in the real scheme, except it sets (htk, htk′, exk) =
PRG(k′), where k′ is the key B chose at the beginning of the simulation.
• Exposure queries. Algorithm B answers all admissible StateReveal, BroadcastReveal, KeyReveal
and Corrupt queries as S¯ . In the case of an admissible StateReveal, BroadcastReveal, or Corrupt
query, the simulator can answer since it chose all of the associated secrets. For KeyReveal
queries, we use the fact that B is already able to process the server response and client finish
queries, which includes the computation of the secret session key.
• Oracle queries to H1. Whenever A queries the random oracle H1 at (gα, gβ , gγ), B responds
as follows:
– If there is already a mapping of the form [(gα, gβ , gγ) 7→ k] in T1, then B replies with k.
– If either gα 6= gs¯, or gα = gs¯ and O(gβ , gγ) = 0, then B chooses k
r
←− K, adds the
mapping [(gα, gβ , gγ) 7→ k] to T1 and replies with k.
– If gα = gs¯ and O(gβ , gγ) = 1, then B checks whether there is a mapping of the form
[gβ 7→ k] in T2. If so, B adds the mapping [(gα, gβ , gγ) 7→ k] to T1 and replies with
k. If no such mapping exists in T2, then B samples k
r
←− K, and adds the mapping
[(gα, gβ , gγ) 7→ k] to T1, and the mapping [g
β 7→ k] to T2.
Moreover, if gα = gs¯ and gβ = gx¯ and O(gβ , gγ) = 1, B aborts the simulation and outputs
gγ .
To complete the proof, we show that B perfectly simulates H0 for A. First, the exponents s¯ and x¯
from the Strong-DH challenge are distributed uniformly over Zp, so they are properly distributed.
By construction of the tables T1 and T2 and programming the outputs of the random oracle H1
accordingly, B ensures that all sessions involving the broadcast (S¯, bid) are properly simulated.
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Note that in the simulation, k′ plays the role of H1(g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯), so both the sessions (C¯, bid, sid)
and (S¯, bid, sid) are properly simulated.
Since B perfectly simulates H0 for A, with non-negligible probability, A will query H1 on
(gs¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯). Then B succeeds in the Strong-DH game with the same advantage.
Claim E.4. Hybrids H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguishable if PRG is a secure pseudo-
random generator.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can distinguish between H1 and H2. We use
A to build an algorithm B that can break PRG security. Algorithm B operates as follows. At
the beginning of the game, the PRG challenger samples a seed s
r
←− K, and gives B a string
(htk, htk
′
, exk) where either (htk, htk
′
, exk) = PRG(s) or (htk, htk
′
, exk)
r
←− K3.
Algorithm B starts simulating the protocol execution experiment for A. It chooses all of the
parameters as in the real scheme, and aborts if any of the abort conditions in H1 and H2 are
triggered. During the simulation, if B ever needs to derive keys (htk, htk′, exk) = PRG(k) using
k = H1(g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯), it instead uses the keys (htk, htk
′
, exk) from the PRG challenger.
If (htk, htk
′
, exk) was the output of the PRG, then B correctly simulates H1. In particular,
algorithm B has exactly simulated an execution of the real scheme where the value of the random
oracle H1 at (g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯) is the PRG seed s. Since s is sampled uniformly at random by the PRG
challenger, this value is properly distributed. Moreover, even though the simulator does not know
the seed s, it can still correctly answer all of the adversary’s queries because it never needs to query
H1 at (g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯). If it did, then the experiment aborts. Thus, the adversary’s view of the protocol
execution is simulated perfectly according to the specification of hybrid H1.
Conversely, if the keys (htk, htk
′
, exk) were chosen uniformly at random, then B has correctly
simulated H2. Thus, by security of the PRG, hybrids H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguish-
able.
Claim E.5. Hybrids H2 and H3 are computationally indistinguishable if the underlying encryption
scheme is an authenticated encryption scheme and that sig is a secure signature scheme (and that
the certificates are authenticated).
Proof. Suppose an adversary A is able to distinguish between hybrids H2 and H3 with non-negligible
probability. First, suppose the adversary is able to produce a protocol execution where (Q¯, bid, sid)
does not match (P¯ , bid, sid). We consider two possibilities:
• Suppose that P¯ is the server in the session (P¯ , bid, sid). By definition, the session (Q¯, bid, sid)
matches (P¯ , bid, sid) if it is incomplete. Thus, it suffices to argue that if (Q¯, bid, sid) completes,
it completes with peer P¯ . By admissibility, Q¯ must not have been corrupted before the
completion of (P¯ , bid, sid). The claim then follows by Lemma E.2.
• Suppose that P¯ is the client in the session (P¯ , bid, sid). As in the previous case, the session
(Q¯, bid, sid) is matching if it is incomplete.
Instead, suppose that (Q¯, bid, sid) completes with a peer P 6= P¯ . Since neither P¯ nor Q¯
are corrupt before the completion of their respective session (P¯ , bid, sid) and (Q¯, bid, sid), the
following must have occurred:
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– If (P¯ , bid, sid) completes with peer Q¯, P¯ must have received an authenticated encryption
of a message containing (bid, sid, idQ¯, idP¯ ) under htk
′
.
– If (Q¯, bid, sid) completes with peer P , then Q¯ must have encrypted a message containing
(bid, sid, idQ¯, idP ) under some key (possibly htk
′
). Moreover, this is the only message an
honest Q¯ ever encrypts under any key that contains (bid, sid).
We can use A to construct an algorithm B that breaks the ciphertext integrity of the underly-
ing authenticated encryption scheme. At the beginning of the ciphertext integrity game, the
challenger samples a random encryption key. This key will play the role of htk
′
in the reduc-
tion. During the simulation, algorithm B is given access to an encryption oracle. Algorithm
B responds to all queries as described in H2, choosing all parameters other than htk
′
for itself.
During the simulation, whenever B needs to encrypt a message under htk
′
, it instead forwards
it to the encryption oracle to obtain the ciphertext. When A delivers a response message
containing a ciphertext ct to the session (P¯ , bid, sid), B submits ct to the ciphertext integrity
challenger as its forgery. Otherwise, during the simulation, whenever B needs to decrypt a
ciphertext using the key htk
′
, B checks whether this was one of the ciphertexts it previously
submitted to the encryption oracle. If so, it looks up the corresponding plaintext and uses
that value to simulate the response. If not, B substitutes the value ⊥ for the decryption when
simulating the response.
We argue first that B correctly simulates H2 for A. Since, B chooses all quantities other
than htk
′
as described in H2 and htk
′
is properly sampled by the ciphertext integrity chal-
lenger, it suffices to argue that B correctly simulates the client computation of the finish
message where it needs to decrypt a ciphertext under htk
′
and verify the integrity of the
underlying message. Certainly, if the ciphertext that needs to be verified was supplied to B
by the encryption oracle, B correctly simulates the decryption operation. If the ciphertext
was not one that it received from the encryption oracle, then either it is invalid, in which
case decryption in H2 would also have produced ⊥, or it is valid, in which case it is a forgery.
Thus, assuming the underlying encryption scheme provides ciphertext integrity, B correctly
simulates H2 (this statement can be formalized by introducing another hybrid experiment).
Since B correctly simulates the view of H2 for A with non-negligible probability, A is able to
activate P¯ with a server response message containing a valid encryption ct of a message con-
taining (bid, sid, idQ¯, idP¯ ) under htk
′
. As argued above, the only ciphertext an uncorrupted
Q¯ would construct containing (bid, sid) is for a tuple with the prefix (idQ¯, idP , bid, sid) 6=
(idQ¯, idP¯ , bid, sid). Thus, during the simulation B never needs to query the encryption oracle
on the tuple (bid, sid, idQ¯, idP¯ ), and so it can submit ct as its forgery. We conclude that
as long as the underlying encryption scheme is an authenticated encryption scheme, then
(Q¯, bid, sid) cannot complete with a peer P 6= P¯ .
Next, suppose that the adversary is able to produce a protocol execution where the session key
output by the test session (P¯ , bid, sid) is not atk. We again consider two possibilities:
• Suppose that P¯ is the server in the session (P¯ , bid, sid). Since (P¯ , bid, sid) completes with
peer Q¯ and P¯ is the server, it must be the case that P¯ received a message containing a
signature on a tuple (bid, sid, idP¯ , idQ¯, g
s¯, gx
′
) under the key identified by idQ¯ for some x
′ ∈ Zp.
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From the above analysis, with overwhelming probability, the session (Q¯, bid, sid) matches
(P¯ , bid, sid). By the admissibility requirement, this means that Q¯ has not been corrupted
before the completion of (P¯ , bid, sid). Thus, Q¯ would only sign a message containing (bid, sid)
if it was activated to initiate a session (Q¯, bid, sid). By construction, the simulator uses x¯ as
the ephemeral exponent when initiating this session. Moreover, the only message an honest
Q¯ signs that contains (bid, sid) also contains gx¯ as the client’s DH share. Thus, it must be
the case that x′ = x¯, since otherwise, the adversary can be used to forge signatures under
the public key bound to idQ¯. Finally, if the remaining validation checks pass and (P¯ , bid, sid)
completes with Q¯, then P¯ uses y¯ as its ephemeral exponent and derives the session key atk
using the DH shares gs¯, gx¯, gy¯. In this case, atk = atk, as desired.
• Suppose that P¯ is the client in the session (P¯ , bid, sid). This means that P¯ received an
ephemeral share gy
′
and an authenticated encryption of the tuple (bid, sid, idQ¯, idP¯ , g
s¯, gx¯, gy
′
)
for some y′ ∈ Zp under the key htk
′
. If so, then P¯ derives the session key atk from gs¯, gx¯,
and gy
′
. Since Q¯ has not been corrupted before the completion of (P¯ , bid, sid), it sends
at most one encryption of a message containing (bid, sid). From the specification of the
simulator, we also have that when Q¯ is activated as a responder to the session (bid, sid), it
uses y¯ as its ephemeral exponent. Thus, the only ciphertext an uncompromised Q¯ constructs
that encrypts (bid, sid) also contains gy¯. By the same argument as above, we appeal to the
security of the authenticated encryption scheme (in particular, ciphertext integrity) to argue
that y′ = y¯ with overwhelming probability. Otherwise, the adversary must have been able to
create a new ciphertext (under htk
′
) encrypting (bid, sid) and gy
′
for y′ 6= y¯, thereby breaking
ciphertext integrity. We conclude that if (P¯ , bid, sid) completes, P¯ derives the shared key
from gs¯, gx¯, and gy¯, in which case atk = atk. Note that this also shows that if two matching
session complete, then they both derive the same session key.
Claim E.6. Hybrids H3 and H4 are computationally indistinguishable if the Extract function is a
secure pseudorandom function.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can distinguish between H3 and H4. It is straight-
forward to use A to build a PRF adversary for Extract. In hybrids H3 and H4, the extraction key
exk used as the key to Extract is sampled uniformly at random (and independently of other scheme
parameters). Moreover, the responses to the adversary’s queries (other than Corrupt queries to P¯
and Q¯, which are not admissible), are independent of exk in hybrids H3 and H4.
We now use A to build a PRF adversary B. Algorithm B makes a single query H2(gx¯, gy¯, gx¯y¯)
to the PRF oracle and sets atk to be the output from the PRF oracle. In the pseudorandom
world (where the response is the output of the PRF instantiated with a random key), then B has
correctly simulated H3 (where exk plays the role of the PRF key). If the output is a uniformly
random string, then B has correctly simulated H4. Thus, by PRF security of Extract, H3 and H4
are computationally indistinguishable.
To conclude the proof, we argue that in H4, the view of the adversary is independent of the
challenge bit. First, the challenger’s response to the Test query is uniformly random over K re-
gardless of the challenge bit. Finally, it suffices to argue that atk is never used anywhere else in
H4, and thus, is still uniform given the adversary’s view of the protocol execution. By construction
of the simulator, atk is only used in sessions when the shares (gs¯, gx¯, gy¯, gs¯x¯, gx¯y¯) are used to derive
the session key. By admissibility, the adversary is not allowed to expose session (P¯ , bid, sid) or
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its matching session, (Q¯, bid, sid). In all other honest sessions on which the adversary could issue
a KeyReveal query, the simulator must have chosen at least one of the DH exponents s, x, or y.
Since the adversary can only initiate a polynomial number of sessions and the exponents s, x, y are
sampled uniformly from Zp where p is super-polynomial in the security parameter λ, we conclude
that with overwhelming probability, at least one of s 6= s¯, x 6= x¯, or y 6= y¯. Thus, the simulator’s
response to all of the adversary’s queries (other than the Test query) is independent of atk, which
proves the claim. Moreover, we note that in each of the reductions, the simulator always picked
y¯
r
←− Zp for itself. Thus, in each case, the simulator is able to respond to a StateReveal query against
the server in the test session. This completes the analysis of Case 1.
Case 2: s is compromised after the handshake. In this case, we rely on the security of
the server’s ephemeral DH share to ensure confidentiality of the session key. Our analysis is very
similar to that of Case 1. We begin by describing our hybrid experiments:
• Hybrid H0: This is the real protocol execution experiment (same as in Case 1).
• Hybrid H1: Same as in Case 1, except the abort condition is only checked before the com-
pletion of the test session (P¯ , bid, sid).
• Hybrid H2: Same as in Case 1.
• Hybrid H3: Same as in Case 1.
• Hybrid H4: Same as H4, except the value ofH2(g
x¯, gy¯, gx¯y¯) is replaced by a uniformly random
value over K.
• Hybrid H5: Same as H5, except atk is replaced by a uniformly random value over K.
Hybrids H0 through H3 are computationally indistinguishable by applying the same arguments as
in Case 1 (Claims E.3 through E.5). Note that the proof of Claim E.3 continues to hold because
we assume that s¯ is uncompromised before the completion of the test session. This is the only part
of the protocol where the claim is checked, so the same argument applies. If suffices then to show
that H3, H4, and H5 are computationally indistinguishable.
Claim E.7. Hybrids H3 and H4 are computationally indistinguishable if the Hash-DH assumption
holds in G.
Proof. Suppose there exists an efficient adversary A that can distinguish between hybrids H3 and
H4. We use A to build a distinguisher B for the Hash-DH assumption. Algorithm B is given
as input a Hash-DH challenge (gx, gy, T ) and must decide whether T = H2(g
x, gy , gxy) or if T is
uniform over G.
Algorithm B simulates the protocol execution with the exponents x and y from the Hash-DH
challenge playing the roles of x¯ and y¯ and T playing the role of H2(g
x¯, gy¯ , gx¯y¯). Algorithm B chooses
all of the other parameters that appear in the protocol execution as described in the real scheme.
Since x¯ and y¯ are only used in the test session (P¯ , bid, sid) and its matching session (Q¯, bid, sid), the
simulator is able to answer all of the adversary’s (admissible) queries exactly as in the real scheme.
Thus, if T = H2(g
x, gy , gxy), then B has simulated H3 and if T is uniform, then B has simulated
H4 for A.
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Claim E.8. Hybrids H4 and H5 are computationally indistinguishable if Extract is a strong ran-
domness extractor.
Proof. In H4, atk is the output of Extract on a uniformly random string while in H5, it is a uniformly
random string. With overwhelming probability, the ephemeral DH exponents of all (non-corrupt)
sessions other than the test session will not be x¯ and y¯ (since the simulator chooses the ephemeral
exponents uniformly at random). Thus the value of H2(g
x¯, gy¯, gx¯y¯) is only used once in the simu-
lation and is independent of the adversary’s view (by admissibility). The claim then follows from
the fact that Extract is a strong randomness extractor.
We conclude that hybrids H0 and H5 are computationally indistinguishable. As in Case 1, the
adversary’s view of the protocol execution in H5 no longer depends on the test bit. Thus, the
private discovery protocol in Figure 4 is a secure service-discovery protocol (Definition B.2).
E.2 Security of 0-RTT Protocol
One of the main advantages of the service discovery protocol from Figure 4 is its support for 0-RTT
mutual authentication. To enable support for application data on the first flow, when the client
prepare the initialization message, it derives an additional key using the PRG. More precisely,
when generating the initialization query, it computes k = H1(g
s, gx, gsx) and (htk, htk′, exk, eadk) =
PRG(k). In the first flow of the handshake, it includes any early application data encrypted under
eadk. In this section, we show that this 0-RTT protocol is secure in the one-pass security model
of [KW15, §4.3]. In [KW15, §5.3], Krawczyk and Wee perform a similar analysis for the 0-RTT
mode of the OPTLS protocol in TLS 1.3.
In the one-pass setting, it is not possible to achieve perfect forward secrecy for the lifetime of
the server’s broadcast (since in a 0-RTT protocol, the server is unable to contribute an ephemeral
secret to the session setup). Moreover, the eadk in the 0-RTT protocol is vulnerable to replays of the
client’s message (again, for the lifetime of the server’s broadcast). One way to address the replay
problem is to have each client choose their session id at random and have each server maintain a
list of session ids that have been used for the lifetime of each broadcast.
One-pass security model. We now specify the one-pass security model more formally in the dis-
covery setting. In this model, when the adversary activates a client to initiate a session (P, bid, sid)
with a broadcast message B, if the client does not abort the protocol then it outputs a public tuple
(P, bid, sid, Q) and a secret key eadk. We refer to this tuple as the “one-pass session output” to
distinguish it from the normal session output. The one-pass session output for the server is defined
to be its usual session output. We note that if a client’s one-pass session output is (P, bid, sid, Q),
then if the session (P, bid, sid) completes, it must complete with the same output (P, bid, sid, Q). In
the one-pass setting, we only reason about the first message in the protocol, and so we work only
with the one-pass session outputs.
As usual, the adversary has full control over the network, and can activate parties to initiate
and respond to messages. As before, it can perform BroadcastReveal, StateReveal, KeyReveal, and
Corrupt queries, subject to the usual admissibility constraints. The difference is that now the
KeyReveal query returns eadk instead of the session key. We also modify the adversary’s goal to be
to distinguish the early application data key of a target session rather than the session key. In the
one-pass setting, we impose an additional restriction on the adversary:
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• The adversary cannot issue a BroadcastReveal query on (Q, bid) nor corrupt Q before the
expiration of (Q, bid).
This restriction reflects the fact that perfect forward secrecy is not achievable for the lifetime of
the server’s broadcast. We now prove the following theorem, which proceeds very similarly to the
analysis of Case 1 in the proof of Theorem E.1 in Appendix E.1.1.
Theorem E.9. The protocol in Figure 4 (adapted to the 0-RTT setting) achieves one-pass security
for early application data in the random oracle model, assuming the Strong-DH assumption in G,
and the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives (the signature scheme, the PRG, the
authenticated encryption scheme, and the extraction algorithm).
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem E.1 from Appendix E.1.1. In particular, we define
an analogous simulator S¯ for the one-pass security experiment. We define the following sequence
of hybrid experiments:
• Hybrid H0: This is the real experiment where k = H1(g
s¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯) and (htk, htk
′
, exk, eadk) =
PRG(k).
• Hybrid H1: Same as H0, except the simulator aborts ifA queriesH1 on the input (gs¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯).
• Hybrid H2: Same as H1, except htk, htk
′
, exk, and eadk are all replaced by uniformly random
values over K.
Hybrids H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable by the same argument as in the proof of
Claim E.3. Next, hybrids H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguishable by PRG security using
the same argument as in the proof of Claim E.4.
To complete the proof, we argue that eadk is independent of the adversary’s view of the protocol
execution (before it makes the Test query). By construction eadk is only used in sessions where the
client’s ephemeral DH share is x¯ and the server’s semi-static DH share is s¯. Let (P¯ , bid, sid, Q¯) be
the test session. As usual, let C¯, S¯ ∈
{
P¯ , Q¯
}
denote the client and server, respectively in the test
session. We consider several cases:
• Consider a session (P, bid, sid) where P is the client and (P, bid, sid) 6= (C¯, bid, sid). Since the
simulator chooses the ephemeral DH exponent x uniformly at random in this session, with
overwhelming probability x 6= x¯. Thus, eadk is independent of all parameters and messages
associated with this session.
• Consider a session (P, bid, sid) where P is the client and (P, bid, sid) = (C¯, bid, sid). If P = P¯ ,
then this is the test session and cannot be exposed. Consider the case where P = Q¯. Since
(Q¯, bid, sid) matches (P¯ , bid, sid, Q¯), the adversary can only expose (Q¯, bid, sid) if this session
completes with a peer R 6= P¯ . In this case, P¯ is the server, so applying Lemma E.2, session
(Q¯, bid, sid) can only complete with peer P¯ . Thus (Q¯, bid, sid) will always match the test
session and cannot be exposed.
• Consider a session where (P, bid, sid) where P is the server and (P, bid) 6= (S¯, bid). Since
the simulator chooses the semi-static DH exponent s uniformly at random for the broadcast
(P, bid), with overwhelming probability s 6= s¯. Again, eadk is independent of the session
parameters.
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• Consider a session (P, bid, sid) where (P, bid) = (S¯, bid) but sid 6= sid. Suppose the session
completes with a peerQ and let gx be the client’s ephemeral DH share in (P, bid, sid). We argue
that with overwhelming probability, x 6= x¯. Suppose for sake of contradiction that a session
(P, bid, sid) completes with peer Q and where Q’s ephemeral DH share is gx¯. This means that
P must have received an encryption ctQ of the message (idP , idQ, σQ) under the handshake
traffic key htk derived from (gs¯, gx¯, gs¯x¯). Here, σQ is Q’s signature on a string containing the
tuple (bid, sid) 6= (bid, sid). Whenever the adversary activates a party to initialize a session
other than (P¯ , bid, sid), the simulator chooses an ephemeral DH share x uniformly at random.
With overwhelming probability x 6= x¯. Thus, with overwhelming probability, the simulator
will only construct a single message encrypted under htk, namely the message for session
(P¯ , bid, sid). In particular, ctQ is not a ciphertext constructed by the simulator. Since htk
is uniformly random (and unknown to the adversary), and the encryption scheme provides
ciphertext integrity, this happens with negligible probability. Thus, x 6= x¯ with overwhelming
probability, and eadk is independent of the session parameters.
• Consider a session (P, bid, sid) where P is the server and (P, bid, sid) = (S¯, bid, sid). The case
P = P¯ corresponds to the test session and cannot be exposed. Suppose P = Q¯. Then, the
session (Q¯, bid, sid) matches the test session unless it completes with a peer R 6= P¯ . Suppose
this happens, and let gx be the client’s ephemeral DH share in (Q¯, bid, sid). By the same
argument as in the previous case, we can argue that x 6= x¯ with overwhelming probability
assuming that the underlying encryption scheme provides ciphertext integrity.
We have shown that the simulator’s response to all admissible queries are independent of eadk in
hybrid H3. We conclude that the service discovery protocol in Figure 4 (adapted to the 0-RTT
setting) achieves one-pass security.
E.3 Privacy of Service Discovery Protocol
In this section, we show that the service discovery protocol in Figure 4 is private if the server
encrypts its broadcast using a prefix encryption scheme (as shown in Figure 3). As was the case with
our analysis of the private mutual authentication scheme, we assume the prefix encryption scheme is
constructed from an IBE scheme as described in Section 3.1. In our analysis, we use the same general
privacy model from Appendix C, but adapted to the service discovery setting (Appendix B.1).
Because our protocol supports 0-RTT mutual authentication and client identification is provided on
the first round in the protocol, we can only guarantee a meaningful notion of privacy if we restrict
ourselves to the one-pass security setting introduced in Appendix E.2. Thus, in the following
description, we match sessions based on their one-pass session outputs rather than their session
outputs. We say a session completes (in the one-pass sense) if it produces a one-pass session output.
In particular, in the 0-RTT service discovery model, privacy is achievable as long as the adver-
sary does not expose any session (in the one-pass sense) that involves the test party. Otherwise,
the adversary is able to trivially learn the identity of the test party. We now state our admissibility
requirements more precisely:
• The adversary does not corrupt idT or make a StateReveal query on any session (PT , bid, sid)
that completes (in the one-pass sense).
• Whenever a session (PT , bid, sid) completes (in the one-pass sense) with public output Q, then
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the adversary has not made a StateReveal query on the session (Q, bid, sid), and moreover, Q
is not corrupt before the completion of (PT , bid, sid).
• Whenever a session (P, bid, sid) completes (in the one-pass sense) with public output PT , then
the adversary has not made a StateReveal query on (P, bid, sid).
• Let ΠT denote the set of policies the adversary has associated with the test party PT . Let
I ⊆ [n] be the indices of the parties the adversary has either corrupted or on which it has
issued a BroadcastReveal query in the course of the protocol execution. Then, for all policies
π ∈ ΠT and indices i ∈ I, it should be the case that idi does not satisfy π.
• Whenever the adversary associated a policy π with a broadcast (P, bid) or a session (P, bid, sid),
it must be the case that either id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T both satisfy π or neither satisfy π.
We show the following theorem:
Theorem E.10. The protocol in Figure 4 (where the broadcasts are encrypted under the server’s
policy using a prefix encryption scheme) is private in the random oracle model assuming the IBE
scheme used to construct the prefix encryption scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure, the Strong-DH and
Hash-DH assumptions hold in G, and the underlying cryptographic primitives (the signature scheme,
the PRG, the authenticated encryption scheme, and the extraction algorithm) are secure.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem D.2. As in the proof of Theorem D.2, we first define
a simulator that simulates the role of the challenger for the adversary A in the protocol execution
environment. We then define a series of hybrid experiments.
Specifically, the simulator S takes as input the number of parties n, the security parameter λ,
and the adversary A, and plays the role of the challenger in the protocol execution experiment
with A. At the beginning of the simulation, A submits a tuple of distinct identities (id1, . . . , idn)
and two test identities id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T . During the protocol execution, the simulator chooses the
parameters for each party and responds to the adversary’s queries according to the specification of
the hybrid experiment. We now define our sequence of hybrid experiments:
• Hybrid H0: This is the real experiment Expt0.
• Hybrid H1: Same as H0, except id
(1)
T is used in place of id
(0)
T when simulating handshake
messages for sessions where PT is the client.
• Hybrid H2: Same as H1, except id
(1)
T is used in place of id
(0)
T when simulating handshake
messages for sessions where PT is the server.
• Hybrid H2: This is the real experiment Expt1.
We now show that each consecutive pair of hybrid experiments is computationally indistinguishable.
Claim E.11. Hybrids H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable in the random oracle model
assuming the Strong-DH and Hash-DH assumptions hold in G and the security of the underlying
cryptographic primitives.
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Proof. In the service discovery protocol, the client in the protocol execution always encrypts both
its and the server’s identity under the handshake traffic key htk. Similarly, in the server’s response
message, the server replies with an encryption of both the client’s and server’s identity under
the handshake traffic key htk′. Similar to the proof of Claim D.3, it suffices to argue that the
adversary’s view of the handshake secret keys htk and htk′ in all sessions where PT is the client
is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. The claim then follows by semantic security of
the underlying encryption scheme.
Formally we use the following hybrid argument. Let q be a bound on the number of times the
adversary A activates the test party PT to initiate a session (PT , bid, sid). We define a sequence of
q+1 hybrid experiments H0,0, . . . ,H0,q where in hybrid experiment H0,i, the simulator uses id
(0)
T as
the identity in PT ’s message for the first q− i sessions and id
(1)
T as the identity in the last i sessions.
By construction, H0 ≡ H0,0 and H1 ≡ H0,q. It suffices to argue that for each i ∈ [q], hybrids H0,i−1
and H0,i are computationally indistinguishable.
We now argue that H0,i−1 and H0,i are computationally indistinguishable. It suffices to argue
that the key htk the test party PT uses to encrypt its identity in the (q − i+ 1)
th session is un-
compromised. Let (PT , sid, bid) be the (q − i+ 1)
th session initiated at PT . Let htk and htk
′ be
the handshake keys PT derives in this session to encrypt its identity. We first argue that htk is
uncompromised. An identical argument applies to htk′. By construction, if PT sent an initialization
message in session (PT , sid, bid), it must have completed its session (in the one-pass sense) with a
peer Q. The overall argument now follows identically to that used to argue that the early appli-
cation data key eadk in the client’s message is uncompromised in the proof of Theorem E.9 (since
htk and htk′ play an analogous role as eadk in that proof). To apply the argument from the proof
of Theorem E.9, we let (PT , sid, bid) be the test session, and verify that all the legal queries in the
privacy setting are also admissible in the one-pass security setting.
In the private discovery setting, the adversary cannot corrupt or issue a StateReveal query on
a session (PT , bid, sid). This is because in the one-pass setting, if the adversary activates PT to
initiate a session (PT , bid, sid), and PT does not abort when processing the initialization query,
then the session must have completed in the one-pass sense.
It suffices to check that the adversary does not corrupt Q or issue a BroadcastReveal query on
the broadcast (Q, bid) where Q is the peer of PT in the target session. Since (PT , bid, sid) completes,
by the admissibility condition, Q must not have been corrupt at the time the session completed.
Thus, we can invoke Lemma E.2 to conclude that PT was activated to initiate a session with the
broadcast message output by (Q, bid). Note that the proof of Lemma E.2 only depends on the
broadcast message and the first message in the mutual authentication handshake, so the statement
applies even in our one-pass setting.
By admissibility in the private discovery setting, if the adversary issued a BroadcastReveal query
on (Q, bid), then the policy πQ must not satisfy PT . But in this case, an honest PT would have
aborted the session (PT , bid, sid). We conclude that an admissible adversary could not have made
a BroadcastReveal on the peer’s broadcast (Q, bid). In this case, the target session (PT , bid, sid) is
admissible in the one-pass security setting, and so by the same argument as in the one-pass security
proof (Theorem E.9), we conclude that the handshake security keys htk and htk′ are uniform and
completely hidden to the adversary. The claim then follows by semantic security of the underlying
authenticated encryption scheme.
Claim E.12. Hybrids H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguishable in the random oracle model
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assuming Strong-DH and Hash-DH assumptions hold in G and the security of the underlying cryp-
tographic primitives.
Proof. The proof of this statement follows analogously to that of Claim E.11. We show that in all
sessions where PT is the server, the handshake encryption keys htk and htk
′ for that session have
not been compromised.
In the one-pass model, a client’s initialization message for a session (P, bid, sid) will contain
the identity of the test party idT if and only if (P, bid, sid) completes with one-pass session output
(P, bid, sid, PT ). It suffices to show that (P, bid, sid) is not exposed, in which case the handshake
encryption keys htk and htk′ are uniform and hidden from the adversary (by a similar argument as
that used in the proof of Theorem E.9). The claim then follows by a hybrid argument similar to
the one used in the proof of Claim E.11.
Consider a session (P, bid, sid) that completes with peer PT . Since the session completes, P
could not have been corrupt. In the discovery model, PT also cannot be corrupted. Next, by
admissibility, the adversary cannot issue a StateReveal query on (P, bid, sid). By one-pass security,
the handshake encryption keys for this session are uncompromised. The claim follows by semantic
security of the underlying authenticated encryption scheme.
Claim E.13. Hybrids H2 and H3 are computationally indistinguishable if the underlying IBE
scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure.
Proof. This proof proceeds very similarly to that of Claim D.4. In particular, we let q be an upper
bound on the number of sessions where A activates the test party PT to initiate a broadcast. We
define a sequence of q+1 hybrid experiments H2,0, . . . ,H2,q where hybrid experiment H2,i is defined
as follows:
• Same as H2 except the first i times PT is activated to initialize a broadcast, PT substitutes
the identity id
(1)
T for id
(0)
T in its broadcast. In all subsequent times PT is activated to initialize
a broadcast, it uses the identity id
(0)
T .
We now show that for all i ∈ [q], hybrids H2,i−1 and H2,i are computationally indistinguishable
assuming that the IBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA-secure. Suppose A is able to distinguish H2,i−1 from
H2,i. We use A to construct an adversary B for the IND-ID-CCA-security game. First, B is given
the public parameters mpk for the IBE scheme. Then, B begins running A and obtains a tuple
of identities (id1, . . . , idn) and test identities id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T . Algorithm B simulates the setup
procedure in H2 by choosing signing and verification keys for each party Pi and PT . It also issues
certificates binding idi to the verification key for each Pi. It prepares two certificates binding PT to
identities id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T . Finally, B gives mpk to A and begins simulating the protocol execution
experiment for A:
• Server broadcast queries. When adversary A activates a party P to initiate a broadcast
(P, bid), if P 6= PT , algorithm B simulates the response as in the real scheme. If P = PT ,
then let ℓ be the number of times A has activated PT to initiate a broadcast. Let π be the
policy specified by A. Algorithm B then responds as follows:
– If ℓ < i− 1, B constructs the broadcast as in H3, that is using id
(1)
T .
– If ℓ ≥ i, B constructs the broadcast as in H2, that is, using id
(0)
T .
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– If ℓ = i − 1, B chooses a random DH share s
r
←− Zp, and computes signatures σ0 =
sigPT (bid, id
(0)
T , g
s) and σ1 = sigPT (bid, id
(1)
T , g
s). It submits the tuples (id
(0)
T , g
s, σ0)
and (id
(1)
T , g
s, σ1) to the IBE challenger with π as its challenge identity. It receives a
ciphertext ctS from the challenger. Algorithm B outputs the broadcast (bid,ctS).
• Client initialization queries. When an adversary activates a client P to initiate a session
(P, bid, sid) with a broadcast (bid,ctS) and server policy πS , B does the following:
1. If there is already a session (P, bid, sid), B aborts the session. If P 6= PT and idP does
not satisfy πS , B aborts the session. If P = PT and id
(0)
T does not satisfy πS , B also
aborts the session. Recall that our admissibility requirement states that either both id
(0)
T
and id
(1)
T satisfy πS or neither satisfy πS .
2. If B is still in the pre-challenge phase, or if B is in the post-challenge phase and either
ctS 6= ctS or πS 6= π¯ (where π¯ is the identity B submitted to the IBE challenger in the
challenge phase), then B queries the IBE decryption oracle on ctS and identity πS to
obtain a decrypted broadcast message (or ⊥). Algorithm B performs the checks on the
decrypted broadcast message and simulates the response as described in H2.
If B is in the post-challenge phase and ctS = ctS and πS = π¯, then B aborts the session
if id
(0)
T does not satisfy the the client’s policy (specified by the adversary). Again, by
admissibility, either both id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T satisfy the client’s policy or neither do. If B
does not abort the session, then B simulates the client’s response message as described
in H2 (always using the identity id
(1)
T for idT ).
• Server response queries. These are handled exactly as in H2 and H3. They are independent
of the IBE parameters.
• Client finish queries. These are handled exactly as in H2 and H3.
• StateReveal and KeyReveal queries. These are handled exactly as in H2 and H3.
• Corrupt queries. If A asks to corrupt a party P 6= PT (since A is admissible), B queries
the IBE extraction oracle for the secret keys for idP and each prefix of idP . It gives these
secret keys to A, the long-term signing key associated with idP , and any ephemeral secrets
for incomplete sessions currently in the local storage of P .
At the end of the game, adversary A outputs a guess for whether it is in H2 or H3. Algorithm B
echoes this guess.
To complete the proof, we show that B is an admissible IBE adversary in the IND-ID-CCA-
security game. By construction, B never asks the adversary to decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Similar to the proof of Claim D.4 we appeal to the admissibility of A to argue that algorithm
B never needs to query the extraction oracle for the identity π¯ in the challenge query during the
simulation.
By construction, if B receives an encryption of id
(0)
T from the IBE challenger, then it has
correctly simulated the broadcast queries according to the specification of hybrid H2,i−1 for A.
If it receives an encryption of id
(1)
T from the IBE challenger, then it has correctly simulated the
broadcast queries according to the specification of hybrid H2,i for A.
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To conclude the proof, we check that the client initialization queries are correctly simulated.
The only non-trivial case is when the adversary submits ctS = ctS and πS = π¯S. All other cases
are processed exactly as in H2 and H3. In the case where ctS = ctS and πS = π¯S, the ciphertext
is either a valid encryption of a broadcast from PT with identity id
(0)
T or with identity id
(1)
T . By
admissibility, the client will either accept both id
(0)
T and id
(1)
T or neither. Thus, in the real scheme,
the client’s decision to abort the session is independent of whether the server’s identity is id
(0)
T
or id
(1)
T . The response generation step in H2 and H3 depends only on id
(1)
T , and is in particular,
independent of the world bit for the IBE security game. Thus, correctness of the simulation
follows. Thus, if the IBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA secure, then H2 and H3 are computationally
indistinguishable.
Combining Claims E.11 through E.13, we conclude that the service discovery protocol in Figure 4
(where the broadcasts are encrypted under the server’s policy using the prefix encryption scheme)
is a private service discovery protocol.
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